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Abstract
This dissertation focuses on the conditions under which innovating firms may employ external
commercialization strategies to appropriate value from their innovations and enhance firm
performance. Specifically, I examine the relationship between appropriability conditions of
intellectual property protection, complementary assets and uncertainty, and the firm’s decision to
commercialize innovations externally. Applying real options theory to a firm’s innovation
strategy, I hypothesize that external commercialization strategies mediate the effect of
appropriability conditions on firm performance. Hypotheses tests are conducted on a sample of
more than 1600 firms and 300 external commercialization agreements in the manufacturing
sector. Notwithstanding the overall lack of support for these hypotheses, there remains potential
for making a contribution to the innovation literature. First, the integration of real options theory
and the appropriability framework offers a theoretical extension of both literatures. Second,
results of post-hoc tests indicate that some relationships do exist and further investigation is
warranted.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Firms in the US spent $330 billion on innovation in 2008 (NSF, 2010), with each firm
aiming to benefit from their investment. Indeed, strategic management literature points to
innovation as a source of competitive advantage and one explanation for why some firms
outperform others (Hamel, 2000; D’Aveni, Dagnino & Smith, 2010). Overall support for the link
between firm innovation and performance contributes to the view that firms will benefit from
investing in innovation (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010; Rosenbusch, Brinckmann & Bausch, 2011).
However, innovating firms do not always realize the value generated by investing in innovation
(Arrow, 1962; Schumpeter, 1950). Some of the value generated by investing in innovation may
be absorbed by other firms including imitators, suppliers, customers or even partners (Teece,
1986). Thus, it appears that it is not sufficient for firms simply to invest in innovation. To realize
performance advantages, it is also necessary for innovating firms to appropriate the value
generated by this investment (Winter, 2006).
Open innovation has been proposed as one strategy firms can use to increase
appropriation from their investment in innovation (Chesbrough, 2003; Pisano & Teece, 2007).
Open innovation capitalizes on the view of innovation as commercialized invention
(Schumpeter, 1934). It recognizes that invention and commercialization are not only separate
functions of innovation but can be performed by different firms (Teece, 1986). Open innovation
is defined as “the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal
innovation, and expand the markets for external use of innovation” (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke
& West, 2006: p. 1).1 Thus, firms stand to gain from both searching for external sources of
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Although the terms are similar, open source software and other types of open systems are different than open
innovation and lie outside the scope of this dissertation. Open source software (OSS) is continuously re-invented by
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technology and intellectual property that can be brought inside the firm to be developed and
actively searching for external channels to market for technology and intellectual property that
was developed inside the firm but may appropriate additional value if commercialized outside
the firm (Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2009; Jacobides, Knudsen & Augier, 2006). It is the latter
strategy, to appropriate value from external commercialization of innovation, which is of primary
interest in this dissertation.
I define external commercialization as an organization’s deliberate commercialization of
technological knowledge to an outside organization, exclusively or in conjunction with internal
commercialization (Chesbrough, 2003; Lichtenthaler, 2005; 2009). That is, external and internal
commercialization strategies are not mutually exclusive for any one innovation or across the
firm’s innovation portfolio. Mechanisms for external commercialization include but are not
limited to outlicensing, spin outs and patent sales (Chesbrough, 2003). Economic estimates place
firm revenue from industrial technology licensing at more than $60 billion in the United States
and $100 billion worldwide (Arora & Gambardella, 2010a; Robbins, 2009).
Exemplars of the external commercialization strategy include firms such as Texas
Instruments which earns up to half its net income from licensing revenues in some years
(Chesbrough & Garman, 2009). Similarly, Qualcomm opted for a business model of licensing its
technology to device makers rather than manufacturing handsets in competition with them
(Pisano & Teece, 2007). IBM and Dow Chemical have undertaken aggressive programs to
monetize their rich patent stocks through outlicensing. IBM collects as much as $1billion, over
15% of its R&D expenditure, in licensing revenue annually (Chesbrough & Garman, 2009).
a developer community that has full access to the source code. As a condition of use, the developers must make their
enhancements to the source code freely available to others in the community (The Open Source Initiative). This
open source model promotes widespread value creation and knowledge transfer among the community of interest,
while effectively precluding value capture by any one member of the community (Alexy & Reitzig, 2012;
Vitharana, King & Chapman, 2010).
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Xerox is an example of a firm that struggled to commercialize technologies developed in its
PARC research center and eventually adopted a spin out strategy to commercialize its
technologies. Adobe, 3Com and SynOptics are examples of successful companies spun out of
Xerox technology (Rosenbloom & Chesbrough, 2002). Likewise, Lucent and British Telecom
have leveraged their technology with a spin out strategy (Chesbrough & Garman, 2009).
External commercialization strategies are also used by smaller firms. Studies of firms in the
biopharmaceutical industry confirm that external commercialization through licensing can be a
viable strategy for firms that do not vertically integrate into manufacturing and marketing
(Kollmer & Dowling, 1994; Walter, 2012).
Research Questions
The literature investigating firm motivations for external commercialization focuses
largely on the influence of intellectual property protection on a firm’s propensity to license its
technology (Arora, Fosfuri & Gambardella, 2004). Mixed empirical results, combined with
insights from the seminal work of Teece (1986), laid the groundwork for researchers to
investigate additional conditions that would affect a firm’s ability to appropriate value from
innovation. Teece (1986) proposed that together with intellectual property protection, a firm’s
control over complementary assets and uncertainty related to market demand and technological
trajectories influenced whether a firm was likely to appropriate value from its innovation.
Subsequent research has investigated the influence of these appropriability conditions on the
firms licensing activity (e.g. Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; Ceccagnoli, 2009; Fosfuri, 2006). Yet, these
studies do not link external commercialization with firm performance.
Given the important contribution of the appropriability framework (c.f. Research Policy
2006 special issue) and the body of literature investigating firm licensing behavior (c.f. Arora &
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Gambardella, 2010a for a review), it is surprising that no study has yet conducted an empirical
investigation of the performance outcomes of external commercialization in the context of the
appropriability framework. In the only study that I am aware of that links external
commercialization to firm performance, the influence of the appropriability conditions were not
investigated (Walter, 2012). Moreover, extensions of the appropriability framework propose that
firms may deploy external commercialization to strategically reposition themselves with respect
to appropriability conditions and thus improve their performance outcomes (Jacobides et al.,
2006; Pisano & Teece, 2007). However, the empirical work to support this proposition has not
yet been undertaken.
At the same time external commercialization appears to be underutilized in practice
(Chesbrough, 2003; Pisano & Teece, 2007). Despite the anecdotal evidence and billions of
dollars in licensing revenue already collected by firms, a closer examination reveals that a
limited number of firms account for the majority of external commercialization activity and
much of it occurs between affiliated companies (Arora & Gambardella, 2010b; Robbins, 2009).
Although proponents of external commercialization provide a convincing argument for more
firms to adopt this strategy, empirical evidence to identify the conditions under which an external
commercialization decision results in superior firm performance is currently absent.
This opportunity to increase our understanding of external commercialization as a
strategy to enhance appropriation from innovation and firm performance led me to investigate
two research questions:
1. What conditions influence the extent to which a firm engages in external
commercialization?
2. Does external commercialization influence firm performance?
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Another challenge that has stymied progress in the literature is a theoretical foundation
for external commercialization as a strategy to enhance competitiveness and firm performance
(Arora & Gambardella, 2010a; Chesbrough et al., 2006). Research investigating external
commercialization (specifically outlicensing) adopts a transaction cost economics perspective to
explain why technology is commercialized inside or outside the firm (Williamson, 1991).
Although this provides insights on the boundaries of the firm, it does not contribute to
explanations of why some firms outperform others and thus has limited value in guiding firm
strategy.
Theoretical Framework
Accordingly, I draw on real options theory to explain both the external commercialization
decision and its effect on firm performance. The commercialization decision, like other decisions
in the innovation process, is characterized by relatively high technical and market uncertainty
(McGrath, 1997). Real options theory has been applied to previous innovation research to
because it is a useful approach to decision making under uncertainty (McGrath, 1997; McGrath,
Ferrier & Mendelow, 2004). Real options involve investments in real assets which create the
right, but not the obligation, to take an action in the future (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999). For
example an investment in research and development creates an underlying asset in technological
knowledge. This provides the firm with an option to further invest commercialization of the
innovation (Bowman & Hurry, 1993). Thus, I apply real options theory to commercialization of
innovation; conceptualizing external commercialization as a real option on the investment in
innovation.
Although real options theory provides a general theoretical approach to decision making
under uncertainty, more specific criteria are required to apply real options theory as a useful
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heuristic for discrete decisions - such as the commercialization of innovation. Building on the
foundations in the literature, I draw on the appropriability framework (Teece, 1986) to supply
these criteria. Teece (1986) seminal article, commonly referred to as Profiting from Innovation
introduced the appropriability framework to identify conditions under which an innovating firm
could appropriate value from its own innovation. The framework proposed that a firm would
capture the value of an innovation based on; 1) its control over complementary assets (specific or
generic), 2) appropriability regimes (the extent of IP protection), and 3) market timing (technical
and market uncertainty). Through applying real options theory and the appropriability framework
to the investigation of external commercialization and firm performance I aim to make the
following contributions.
Contributions
The principal contribution of this research is to extend the literature on external
commercialization to include the effects on firm performance. This contribution is enhanced by
integrating the appropriability framework to provide the context for the investigation. The extant
literature often studies external commercialization in the context of the appropriability
framework, but we do not know the effects on firm performance under these conditions. The
only study to date examining external commercialization and firm performance does not account
for appropriability conditions (Walter, 2012).
The contribution is further augmented by the large scale empirical design of the study. I
investigate more than 300 external commercialization agreements across 1600 firms from
multiple industries in the manufacturing sector. This design is meant to achieve generalizability
beyond single industry studies (Fosfuri, 2006) or samples that include only firms that engage in
external commercialization (Walter, 2012).
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A second contribution arises from the application of real options theory to external
commercialization strategy. Extension of real options theory from innovation in general to
external commercialization in particular, provides a strategic focus to the study of external
commercialization (McGrath, 1997). Real options theory goes beyond the transactions cost
explanation of the boundaries of the firm to provide a performance based rationale for external
commercialization. In addition, real options theory has been previously recommended as a
relevant theoretical lens for viewing external commercialization strategies (Pisano & Teece,
2007). However this has not been systematically applied in the literature to date.
This dissertation also aims to inform practitioners on several fronts. Foremost, it has
potential to provide empirical evidence to support recommendations for firms to use an external
commercialization strategy. In the absence of a link between external commercialization and
firm performance, this evidence does not currently exist. It also provides real options logic to
show that commercialization decisions may be improved when external commercialization is
included in the heuristics. These contributions may help practitioners garner support for external
commercialization in their organization.
In summary, I have provided an overview of the challenges firms face in appropriating
value from their investment in innovation. I further identified external commercialization as a
potential strategy to enhance appropriation from innovation and firm performance, and pointed
to the absence of empirical evidence for this proposition. Finally, I identified the contributions
that could be made through investigation of the focal research questions in this dissertation. To
conclude Chapter 1, I offer definitions and terms and outline the organization of the dissertation.
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Definitions and Terms
Appropriation, appropriability and appropriability regime. In the context of this
paper appropriation refers to the distribution of value generated from the innovation among the
innovating firm and other entities (Ceccagnoli, 2009; Teece, 1986; Winter, 2006). These entities
include but are not limited to rival firms, new entrants, suppliers or customers (Pisano & Teece,
2007). This is consistent with the industrial economics approach to quasi-rent distribution at the
industry level (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Porter, 1980). In contrast, the appropriation construct
in resource based theory (RBT) is often firm-level rather than industry level. The RBT literature
examines how value captured by the firm is distributed among firm stakeholders such as
employees and shareholders according to relative bargaining power (Coff 1999; 2010). In this
paper I refer to the value appropriated by the innovating firm relative to other firms (Amit &
Schoemaker, 1993; Porter, 1980), rather than to value appropriated by stakeholders relative to
the firm (Coff 1999, 2010).
The term appropriability refers to the extent to which the entity that generated the value
can capture it. For example, the appropriability framework (Teece, 1986) establishes the
conditions that influence the degree to which the innovating firm can capture the value created
from innovation, relative to other entities (Ceccagnoli, 2009; Teece, 1986; Winter, 2006).
Appropriability regime is a specific means of appropriability and refers precisely to “the
protection afforded the innovator by intellectual property protection and natural barriers to
imitation” (Pisano & Teece, 2007: p. 279). As the name implies, the appropriability regime
influences which entities ultimately capture significant shares of the available profits from
innovation (Nelson, 2006; Teece, 2006). A strong appropriability regime offers relatively high
protection for innovators and facilitates value capture by the innovating firm. A weak
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appropriability regime affords relatively low protection for innovators and enables value capture
by other firms in the industry (Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, 2000).
External commercialization. I define external commercialization as an organization’s
deliberate commercialization of technological knowledge to an outside organization, exclusively
or in conjunction with internal commercialization. The definition is built from several terms
defined in previous literature. The first term, outward open innovation, originates in
Chesbrough’s (2003) discussion of open innovation and refers to “internal ideas [that] can also
be taken to market through external channels, outside the current businesses of the firm, to
generate additional value” (2003: p. xxiv). A related term, outbound open innovation, has been
defined as “[external] commercialization of technological knowledge exclusively or in addition
to its internal application” (Lichtenthaler, 2009: p. 318). The last term, external knowledge
commercialization, is described as “an organization’s deliberate commercializing of knowledge
assets to another independent organization involving a contractual obligation for compensation
in monetary or non-monetary terms” (Lichtenthaler, 2005: p. 233). By consolidating the
definition of the focal construct from prior terms and definitions, I build cohesion around the
construct and meaning of external commercialization.
Open innovation. Open innovation is defined as “the use of purposive inflows and
outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the markets for external use
of innovation” (Chesbrough, 2006: p. 10).2 Technology transfer out of research institutions into
the for-profit sector could be considered a specific type of open innovation (Mowery, 2011;
Sampat, 2006). However, these special cases are not the focus of this research. In this study, I
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Similar to open source software, the philosophy of open science is to publish new discoveries so that the scientific
community can access them freely to further advance knowledge. It is possible to conceive of open source and other
open systems as a specific type of open innovation that includes value creation but not value capture (West, 2006).
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consider open innovation among profit seeking firms whose usual business includes invention
and commercialization of technological knowledge.
Real option. Real options involve investments in real assets which create “the right, but
not the obligation, to take an action in the future” (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999: p. 5).
Organization
This dissertation is organized in five chapters. This chapter introduced the purpose of the
study and laid the foundation for investigation of external commercialization through the lenses
of real options theory and the appropriability framework. Chapter 2 is divided into three sections.
The first section provides a literature review of real options theory and introduces the
appropriability framework. The second section of Chapter 2 applies real options theory to
develop a model which explains the factors that influence external commercialization and the
consequences for firm performance. The final section of Chapter 2 elucidates four testable
hypotheses for this model. Chapter 3 outlines the research method including the sample,
measures, and statistical tests of the hypotheses. Chapter 4 reports the results of the analysis.
Finally, Chapter 5 offers a discussion of the salient results, contributions, limitations and future
research opportunities.
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The first section of this chapter provides a literature review of real options theory. Then
real options theory is applied to the focal construct - external commercialization of innovation.
Next, the appropriability framework is introduced to develop a model of external
commercialization based on real options theory. Finally, the hypotheses explicate the
relationships between the appropriability framework, external commercialization and firm
performance.
Real Options
Real options theory extends from its origins in financial options (Black & Scholes, 1973).
A financial option is an instrument that allows an investor to make a small investment in return
for the right, but not the obligation, to make a subsequent investment (in the underlying security)
in the future (Black & Scholes, 1973). The option may be held until future conditions turn
favorable, i.e., the price of the underlying security rises above the option exercise price. At this
point the option may be exercised for a profit. However if future conditions are unfavorable, i.e.,
the price of the security falls below the option exercise price, an investor may let the option
expire and abandon the investment. In this scenario losses are limited to the cost of the option
(Black & Scholes, 1973). Thus, an option has value because it allows the owner to participate in
upside potential while limiting downside losses (Black & Scholes, 1973). This simple and
attractive investment principle led scholars to extend options theory to investments in real assets
(Myers, 1977; Dixit & Pindyck,1994; Trigeorgis, 1996).
Real options involve investments in real assets such as research, development and
commercialization of innovations (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; McGrath, 1997). Similar to financial
options, a real option is “the right, but not the obligation, to take an action in the future” (Amram
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& Kulatilaka, 1999: p. 5). A real option is created through an initial investment in a real asset
that positions the firm to take advantage of an opportunity in the future (Bowman & Hurry,
1993). There are several types of options including growth options, flexibility options, and
nested options. I describe each of these in the next section.
Types of Options
Growth options. Growth options allow managers to stage investments such that smaller
investments can be made initially with the option to increase commitment and expand the project
as success unfolds (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999). For example, joint venture agreements that
contain explicit provisions for buying additional equity are considered growth options (Reuer &
Tong, 2005). Foothold investments for market entry are also considered growth options (Miller
& Folta, 2002). Some growth options are considered platform investments, or learning
investments. For example, basic research and development, while not providing a direct payoff
in the exploratory research stage, creates a platform for development of future applications which
may be exploited at a later stage with further investment (Kim & Kogut, 1996). Additional
examples of growth options include incremental addition of manufacturing capacity, product line
extensions and geographic expansion (Trigeorgis, 1996).
Flexibility options. Flexibility options enable managers to deploy the investment in more
than one way. A classic example is a power plant that can use alternative fuel sources such as
coal, oil or natural gas. The source of fuel can be changed according to the prevailing price of
fuel (Copeland & Antikarov, 2001). Platform investments in basic technologies, treated as a
growth option above, may also be considered a flexibility option because basic technology, for
example GPS, can often be applied in different product markets (Kim & Kogut, 1996).
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Accordingly, alternatives for internal or external commercialization of innovation may be
considered a flexibility option (Vanhaverbeke, Van de Vrande, & Chesbrough, 2008).
Nested options. Nested options, sometimes referred to as compound or embedded
options, emerge as a chain of options in which one investment opens additional options for future
investments (Amram & Kulatilaka,1999). New product development processes are based on a
series of nested options with successive decision points (gate) representing the exercise of an
option to begin the next phase (stage) - or discontinue the project (MacMillan, van Putten,
McGrath & Thompson, 2006). However, nested options are not always specified ex-ante.
Knowledge investments such as those in basic research are commenced with the options for
continuing the research emerging only as the project advances (Kogut, 1991). The option of
external commercialization may also be considered a nested option in that it can only be
considered subsequent to invention.
To illustrate: research and patenting of one specialty chemical compound (platform
investment) may yield five options for new product applications (flexibility option). Managers
may decide to exercise the option for further product development (nested option) for two of
these five options. At a later stage one of these options may be commercialized as a new product
(growth option). After this product is established in core markets managers may choose to make
further investments in product line extensions or new markets (growth options). Meanwhile
mangers may hold the second option in the development stage foregoing commercialization at
the present time. The third option may be licensed to another firm for application in a specific
market (nested/flexibility option), while the remaining two options are abandoned. This example
illustrates how the value of a real option increases as the chain of options magnifies the variance
in outcomes on the upside while limiting the downside. Options seem particularly valuable for
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innovation investments in which technological and market uncertainty are high, specific
outcomes are difficult to specify ex-ante, and managerial discretion to exercise, hold, abandon or
create new options is critical to success (Amram & Kulatilaka,1999; McGrath, 1997).
Real options are sequential investments that can be made under conditions of uncertainty.
In keeping with its core principle in finance, a real option has value because it enables the firm to
capture upside potential while limiting downside losses (Lee, Peng & Barney, 2007; McGrath,
1999; Myers, 1977). The value of a real option is built on three fundamental principles:
irreversibility, uncertainty and managerial flexibility (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Kogut &
Kulatilaka, 2001). Table 2.1 compares real and financial options with respect to these principles.
Real options are characteristically less reversible and more uncertain than financial options and
the managerial flexibility is more complex due to the nature of nested options, which are not
available in financial options. In the next section, I review the real options literature within the
structure of the principles of irreversibility, uncertainty and managerial flexibility.
Irreversibility
The first principle framing real options value is irreversibility. Unlike financial assets that
can be readily traded in secondary markets, investments in real assets tend to be irreversible
(Myers, 1977). Irreversibility is the extent to which the “investment expenditures are sunk costs
… and cannot be recovered” (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994: p. 8). Because managers are reluctant to
incur sunk costs, irreversibility leads firms to delay investment in new projects and hold onto
existing projects longer (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001). Indeed, McGrath & Nerkar (2004) found
that when larger commitments had been made in an existing area, firms were less likely to
pursue new areas. This inertia may be mitigated by adopting a real options approach to managing
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Table 2.1 Comparison of Financial Options and Real Options

Uncertainty

Managerial
Discretion

Irreversibility

Financial Options
Financial options have a fixed
expiration date and exercise price exante. The price of the underlying
security and return on the option
investment is known at the time the
option is exercised. The uncertainty
with respect to a financial option is
limited to the price changes of the
underlying security (above or below
the exercise price), which can be
monitored transparently with
accuracy (Myers, 1977).
Financial options are created when an
option on an underlying security is
purchased. Financial options may be
held until exercised for a profit, held
until expiration (abandoned) or sold
in the secondary market (Black &
Scholes, 1973, Myers, 1977).

Real Options
Investments in real options do not
have a fixed expiration date. The
expected return on investment at the
time the option is exercised can be
forecasted but remains uncertain. The
uncertainty surrounding real options
includes dynamic and complex
environmental factors. The impact of
these factors on the return on
investment over time is uncertain
(Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999; Myers,
1977).
Real options are created when firms
make an initial investment in a real
asset. Real options may be fully
exercised by making a full
investment and completing the
project. Real options may also be
exercised by making an incremental
investment, in effect creating a
subsequent option. Real options can
be held for an indeterminate time
period or abandoned with the sunk
cost limited to the investment to date
(Dixit & Pindyck, 1994;
Trigeorgis,1996).
Investments in real options tend to be
irreversible because there is not an
active secondary market. These
investments may also be firmInvestments in financial options are
specific or ambiguous making them
reversible because they are actively
traded in secondary markets (Black & idiosyncratic to the investing firm
and trading terms difficult to
Scholes, 1973).
determine. Therefore investments in
real options are largely construed as
sunk costs (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994).
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investments in full scale projects, firms using real options make small initial investments
followed by a series of incremental investments prior to making a final commitment with a large
investment. This sequencing of investments allows the firm to initiate more new projects with a
small sunk cost in each one (Bowman & Hurry, 1993). Because the sunk costs are limited,
managers may also be more willing accept sunk costs of unsuccessful projects, and allow funds
to be reallocated to follow on investments in projects with greater prospects (McGrath, 1997).
Based on the assumption of irreversibility, real options predicts that firms will start more and
cancel more projects and make small investments sequentially (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Adner
& Levinthal, 2004b).
Bowman & Hurry (1993) extended these predictions to inferences for firm performance
proposing that: 1) firms using the sequential approach to investing would outperform those that
make single large investments or unrelated small investments, and 2) firms with larger and more
diverse options portfolios would perform better across varying environmental conditions, than
those with a narrower set of options (Bowman & Hurry, 1993). Hurry, Miller & Bowman (1992),
found evidence of real options investment patterns among Japanese investors in technology
ventures. These investors had larger portfolios, and made smaller investments followed by
increasing stakes over time. In contrast, their American counterparts made large investments and
quick exits; however performance was not measured in this study (Hurry, Miller & Bowman,
1992). Folta (1998) also found that biotech firms favored investments in growth and flexibility
options such as joint ventures over full commitments to irreversible investments in internal
development or acquisition. However, Reuer & Leiblein (2000) found that although firms did
exhibit a real options pattern of investment in international expansion, this did not limit
downside risk. Contrary to hypotheses, larger multinational portfolios (measured by the number
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of countries entered), and smaller investments (indicated by the presence of joint ventures)
contributed to below target performance outcomes (Reuer & Leiblein, 2000). These studies
correspond to one of the three real options foundations - irreversibility. Additional investigations
of real options have incorporated the principles of uncertainty and managerial flexibility, which I
review next. Table 2.2 summarizes the empirical research corresponding to these three principles
of real options theory.
Uncertainty
Decision making under uncertainty is the cornerstone of real options theory (Dixit &
Pindyck, 1994; Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999). Uncertainty is reflected in the dynamism and
complexity of the external environment (Aldrich 1979; Dess & Beard, 1984) and the ambiguity
and complexity of the internal task environment (Duncan, 1972; Reus, Ranft, Lamont & Adams,
2009). In the context of innovation, the uncertainty associated with market timing, the
combination of technical and demand uncertainty, is particularly relevant (Santos & Eisenhardt,
2009; Teece, 1986).
Technical uncertainty occurs in the external environment due to the array of competitors
(complexity) vying for technical and market dominance in the industry and the pace (dynamism)
at which it evolves (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975; Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984). Technical
uncertainty outside the firm is resolved over time as firms acquire new information about the
emergence of dominant technologies and competitors (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Reus et al., 2009).
Thus external technical uncertainty incents firms to hold options while competitive dynamics are
played out and new information is acquired (McGrath, 1997).
In contrast, technical uncertainty inside the firm is resolved through action and further
investment (Galbraith, 1973; Thompson, 1967). For example, investments in research and
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development, knowledge management systems and cross-functional knowledge transfer are
instrumental in reducing internal technical uncertainty associated with innovation (Kogut &
Zander, 1992; Reus et al., 2009). Therefore, in contrast to external sources of technical
uncertainty, internal technical uncertainty creates urgency for firms to act (Dixit & Pindyck,
1994; Folta, 1998; McGrath, 1997).
Market uncertainty is a source of external uncertainty and is comprised of demand and
competitive uncertainty (Folta, 1998; McGrath, 1997). Demand uncertainty stems from the
unpredictability of the size and rate of growth in new product markets (Eisenhardt &
Schoonhoven, 1996). Demand uncertainty creates an incentive for the firm to delay investment
until more information emerges and uncertainty is diminished (Duncan, 1972; Reus et al., 2009).
Yet the threat of competitive preemption poses a risk to delay (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994;
Kulatilaka & Perotti, 1998). This tension between action and deferment, that is exercising or
holding an option, is amplified in environments of high dynamism and complexity (Duncan,
1972; Folta & O’Brien, 2004). Thus, greater uncertainty increases the value of holding an option
(Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001; Reuer & Tong, 2005).
Bowman & Hurry (1993) proposed that firms which hold options in uncertain
environments and exercise options as uncertainty is reduced will have superior growth and profit
performance in the long term. To accomplish this, firms must be attuned to information that
signals a change in the level of uncertainty. Opportunity arrival signals such as an increase in
demand, adoption of a technology standard or opening of international markets signal reduced
uncertainty and provide an impetus to take action and exercise the option. Opportunity expiration
signals such as competitive preemption indicate the closure of an opportunity is imminent and
the option would have little value if held beyond this point. Bowman & Hurry (1993) proposed
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that options that are exercised in response to receiving both opportunity arrival and expiration
signals will perform better than options exercised in response to only one signal or no
information at all. Although empirical tests linking the holding or exercise of real options to firm
performance are lack, several studies do provide evidence of the propensity to exercise options
under conditions of uncertainty.
Kogut (1991) applied real options theory to the study of joint ventures, focusing on the
propensity for firms to acquire or divest their position in the joint venture in response to
resolution of market uncertainty. A joint venture represents creation of a real option because it is
an initial investment in an uncertain opportunity that frequently contains the right but not the
obligation to increase participation in the future through acquisition of the partner’s interest. A
joint venture also limits downside loss by sharing the investment and risk with one or more
partners and allowing for divestment in the future (Kogut, 1991). The study found that positive
market demand signals increased the propensity to acquire the partner’s interest in the joint
venture, supporting the idea that opportunity arrival signals encourage exercise of the options
(Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Kogut, 1991). However negative market demand signals had no effect
on divestment. Firms continued to hold options and delay further investment even in response to
negative signals, suggesting the presence of option traps (Adner & Levinthal, 2004b; Kogut,
1991).
Further evidence that firms exercise options as uncertainty is reduced is provided by
Folta & Miller (2002). This study of biotech firms found evidence to suggest that firms exercised
options to acquire additional equity in technology partners in response to opportunity arrival
signaled by an increase in the market value of the partner firm. Likewise, opportunity expiration
signaled by an increased likelihood of competitive preemption triggered a similar response.
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Table 2.2 Real Options Theory Empirical Studies
Authors/Journal

Topic/Sample

Variables and Measures

Major Findings

Irreversibility
Hurry, Miller &
Bowman, 1992, SMJ

Venture capital
Survey of 20 Japanese and 20
US Venture capital firms and
corporate venturing units

Reuer & Leiblein,
2000

International joint ventures
and subsidiary investments
357 manufacturing firms,
Compustat, CRSP and
Directory of Corporate
Affiliations

Comparison of Japanese and
US venture capital investment
patterns.
IV: Frequency of categorical
measures for size of
investment, size of portfolio,
time horizon, strategic
objectives and monitoring.
DV: below target performance
outcomes
IV: number of countries,
number of IJV’s

Venture capital investment behavior of Japanese
firms fits the pattern of real options with small
investments followed by increasing stakes over
time, large portfolios and long term interest.

Contrary to theory and hypotheses multinationality
do not reduce downside risk. and IJV’s increase
downside risk

Uncertainty
Kogut, 1991

Joint ventures
Survey of 92 joint ventures

Kim & Kogut, 1996

Platform technologies and
market entry

DV: propensity to acquire or
divest.
IV: Annual venture growth

DV: Entry in a new area
IV: market growth, prior
experience

176 semiconductor startups
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A joint venture represents the option to expand. A
favorable market demand signal increases the
propensity to acquire (growth option). Negative
signals have no effect on dissolution (option to
delay).
Platform technologies create options on the future
technological trajectory and market entry. Market
entry timing coincides with growth markets in a new
technological area.

Table 2.2 Continued
Authors/Journal
McGrath & Nerkar,
2004

Topic/Sample
R&D investment

31 pharmaceutical firms,
1979-1995: Cox proportional
hazard

Reuer & Tong, 2005,
JOM

International joint ventures
SDC database IJV’s 19952002.
2,594 IJV transactions

Tong, Reuer & Peng,
2008

Oriani & Sobrero,
2008 SMJ

International joint ventures
293 firms, 2698 firm year
observations 1989-2000.
SDC, Stern Stewart,
Compustat
R&D investment
290 UK manufacturing firms

Variables and Measures
DV: Propensity to take out a
growth option (second patent
in a new area).
IV: Scope of opportunity
(number of technological
classes and claims on the first
patent); Cumulative
investment (patent count);
Effects of competition
(number of competitors and
patents per competitor in the
new area).
DV: explicit option to acquire
equity in an IJV
IV: core v. non-core SIC,
intellectual property rights in
host country, cultural distance,
political turmoil,
DV: growth option value
IV: number of IJV’s, minority
stake, core v. noncore.

Major Findings
The propensity to invest in a growth option in a new
area is positively related to the scope of opportunity
in that area.
There is a negative relationship between the
propensity to invest in a growth option in a new area
and the extent of commitments and cumulative
investments in prior areas.
There is a positive relationship between the
propensity to invest in a growth option in a new area
and the level of competition in that area.

DV: market value
of R&D investment
IV: market uncertainty,
technical uncertainty
M: munificence

Market uncertainty has a U shaped relationship with
market value of R&D investment, matter of growth.
Technical uncertainty has an inverted U shaped
relationship with market value of R&D, matter of
survival.
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An explicit option to acquire equity in an IJV is
more likely under conditions of greater uncertainty.
This is an example of a growth option.

Minority IJV’s and diversifying IJV’s contribute to
growth option value but other types do not.

Table 2.2 Continued
Authors/Journal

Topic/Sample

Variables and Measures

Major Findings

Managerial Flexibility
Folta, 1998

Governance
402 transactions in biotech

Folta & Miller, 2002

Equity stake in technology
partner

Folta & O’Brien, 2004

Market entry
Compustat

DV: propensity to take an
equity stake, form a JV or
acquire.
IV: technological distance,
growth potential, exogenous
technical uncertainty, threat of
preemption
DV:

DV: market entry
IV: uncertainty
M: irreversibility, value of
growth opportunity, early
mover advantage
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Propensity for joint ventures and equity stakes over
internal investment or acquisition of new
technologies in environments of high exogenous
technological uncertainty.

Resolution of uncertainty and threat of competitive
preemption increased the propensity to buy out the
joint venture partner (exercise the option).
The tension between option to defer and option to
grow in the presence of uncertainty. Nonmonotonic
relationship. Uncertainty decreases propensity to
enter until threshold is reached and higher levels
increase propensity to enter.

Similarly, McGrath & Nerkar (2004) found that pharmaceutical firms were more likely to invest
in growth options in a new area when the scope of opportunity was large (opportunity arrival
signal) and competitive preemption was considered likely (opportunity expiration signal).
Subsequent studies of international joint ventures provide support for the proposition that
greater uncertainty increases the value of holding an option. Reuer & Tong (2005) found that
higher uncertainty in external host country conditions and internal technical experience increased
the likelihood that international joint venture agreements would contain an explicit option to
acquire equity in the future. Similarly, Tong, Reuer & Peng (2008) found that conditions of
greater uncertainty, specifically joint ventures with minority stakes or that are outside the firm’s
core business, increased the option value of the firm. Conversely, conditions of less uncertainty
such as majority stakes or core business joint ventures did not increase the option value of the
firm.
Oriani & Sobrero (2008) investigated the market value of the firm’s R&D investment
under conditions of technical and market uncertainty. They found evidence consistent with
theory that greater market uncertainty increases the value of the option to delay further
investment. However, this relationship reached an inflection point beyond which increasing
uncertainty decreased the value of the option to delay and increased the value the growth option
created by incremental investment in R&D. This U-shaped relationship suggests that when
market growth potential is very high growth options have more value than options to delay.
Conversely, greater technical uncertainty increased the value of growth and flexibility options
initially, but again reached an inflection point beyond which the value of these options declined.
This inverted U relationship suggests that when technical uncertainty is very high, the option to
delay has higher value than growth and flexibility options. Overall, these findings support theory
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on the tensions between the option to delay investment and the incremental investment in growth
or flexibility options.
These findings are consistent with earlier studies of uncertainty and market entry
decisions. Folta & O’Brien (2004) found evidence of a non-monotonic relationship such that
uncertainty decreases the propensity to enter new markets (option to delay) until a threshold is
reached; then higher levels increase the propensity to enter new markets (growth option).
The third type of uncertainty, and perhaps of most interest to strategic management
scholars, is that segment of external uncertainty that firms can influence through strategic action
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). Real
options investments have been characterized as strategic actions aimed at influencing external
uncertainty idiosyncratically in favor of the firm, without benefitting all firms (McGrath, 1997;
Kulatilaka & Perotti, 1998). Options investments in technological innovations move firms up the
experience curve ahead of competitors, reducing internal uncertainty (Kogut & Kulatilaka,
2001). These investments also influence the technological platform in the industry to move in the
direction of the firm’s technology, reducing external uncertainty in its favor (Kim & Kogut,
1996). This secures an advantageous industry position for the firm; while firms without prior
experience will be at a disadvantage, as will those that committed fully to investments that are
not aligned with the emergent industry technology (Kulatilaka & Perotti, 1998;). Thus,
investments in technological innovations using a real options approach influence the competitive
environment in favor of the innovating firm (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001; McGrath, 1997).
Jacobides et al., 2006) along with Pisano & Teece (2007) propose that firms may influence
industry architectures in their favor through proactive engagement of potential partners and
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rivals. Some of this engagement is likely to be in the form of deliberate external
commercialization through other firms (Chesbrough, 2003; Pisano & Teece, 2007).
To summarize, internal uncertainty is reduced through learning and experience (Kogut &
Zander, 1992; Reus et al., 2009), and external uncertainty is resolved as market and competitive
scenarios are revealed through new information (Reus et al., 2009; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven,
1996). In addition options investments in capabilities may influence the resolution of uncertainty
in the firm’s favor, which positions the firm to exploit the opportunity advantageously relative to
industry competitors (Kim & Kogut, 1996; Jacobides et al., 2006). Thus, from a real options
perspective uncertainty is construed as an opportunity (Kogut, 1991; Kim & Kogut, 1996) rather
than a threat (Cyert & March, 1963). Optimal exploitation of these opportunities depends on the
third tenet of real options theory, managerial flexibility.
Managerial Flexibility
Managerial flexibility to adapt strategic investment decisions in a contingent fashion is
the third principle of option value (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Managerial flexibility captures the
intuitive appeal of ‘keeping your options open’ in uncertain environments (Bowman & Hurry,
1993). “In sum, real options are investments that can be characterized as sequential, irreversible
investments made under conditions of uncertainty. The options create value by generating future
decision right and, in this way, providing strategic flexibility. This flexibility is more valuable
the higher the level of uncertainty” (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2008). This flexibility is expressed in
different option decisions which include hold, exercise or abandonment (Copeland & Antikarov,
2001; Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999).
Hold. Managers may hold the option created by the initial investment until more
information is known and uncertainty is reduced. For example, minority stakes in joint ventures
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can be held until favorable demand signals trigger managers to exercise the option and increase
the equity stake in the joint venture (Folta, 1998; Folta & Miller, 2002; Folta & O’Brien, 2004).
However, holding the option is valuable only if the forthcoming information is worth more than
the risk of competitive pre-emption (Trigeorgis, 1996). Holding an option is often referred to as a
timing option or an option to delay (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999).
Exercise. Options are exercised when opportunity arrival or expiration signals prompt
managers to act (Bowman & Hurry, 1993). Options are fully exercised when full investments are
made to complete the project, such as acquisition of a joint venture partner or commercialization
of a new product. Alternatively, when options are exercised incrementally a series of nested
options are created and this sequence is followed until the project is completed or abandoned.
Abandonment. Abandonment refers to the decision to stop investment and cancel the
project (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). If the project changes form and
continues, this is considered a nested option, rather than abandonment (Bowman & Hurry, 1993;
McGrath et al., 2004). Recalling that the premise of options is to limit downside risk while
enhancing upside potential, the option to halt investment and abandon the project must be
available (Adner & Levinthal, 2004a). “It is precisely the choice of walking away from a venture
that gives meaning to the term 'option', incidentally” (Hurry et al., 1992: p. 97). A good deal of
debate surrounding the abandonment option and the risk of option traps continues in the
literature (Adner & Levinthal, 2004a; Adner & Levinthal, 2004b; McGrath et al., 2004).
An option trap describes managers propensity to continue rather than abandon projects
(Adner & Levinthal, 2004a). Options traps are facilitated by the fact that real options do not have
an expiration date and can be held or nested indefinitely (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Adner &
Levinthal (2004) argue that real options must include ex-ante criteria for project abandonment to
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meet the options assumption of limits on downside risk. When real options are applied without
abandonment criteria managers are caught in option traps that facilitate their tendency to
continue projects, rather than cancel them (Barnett, 2008; Coff & Laverty, 2001). In the option
trap scenario managers avoid cancellation of projects that might be successful in the future.
However, this means continuing projects that may be unsuccessful and is likely to result in
overinvestment (Adner & Levinthal, 2004b). This is a type I error, equivalent to accepting an
incorrect hypothesis. Conversely, evaluation processes that emphasize risk reduction to avoid
type I errors, may result in underinvestment and missed opportunities. This is a type II error,
equivalent to rejecting a correct hypothesis (Chesbrough, 2003; Coff & Laverty, 2001). This
tradeoff, depicted in Table 2.3, is at least partly imposed by the boundaries of the firm.
Table 2.3 Errors in Internal Commercialization of Innovations
Abandon

Commercialize

Innovation would be
successful

Type II error
Incorrectly abandon an
otherwise successful innovation

Correctly commercialize a
successful innovation

Innovation would be
unsuccessful

Correctly abandon an
unsuccessful innovation

Type I error
Incorrectly commercialize an
unsuccessful innovation

Consider the option to commercialize an innovation. When evaluated within the
boundaries of the firm the decision alternatives are to hold, exercise or abandon. Holding the
option means delaying commercialization but keep the project alive. This is the scenario that
leads to potential option traps of continuing projects indefinitely in the absence of abandonment
criteria (Adner & Levinthal, 2004a). Exercising the option involves a full investment in
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commercialization of the innovation (and risk of type I error). Abandonment halts investment in
the innovation, realizing full sunk costs (and risk of type II error). However, options for external
commercialization (outside the boundaries of the firm) have potential to mitigate the tradeoffs
inherent in closed (internal) innovation approaches (Chesbrough, 2003). An option to license a
patent or process to an outside firm strikes a balance between in avoiding both type I and type II
errors. For example, licensing a technology to an outside firm enables the firm to both save the
full cost of commercialization and recoup some of the investment through licensing fees
(Fosfuri, 2006).
In sum, this section provided a review of real options theory framed by the core tenets of
irreversibility, uncertainty and managerial flexibility. Table 2.2 summarizes the empirical
literature on real options theory. The section concluded with the risks of real options traps and
the tradeoffs associated with innovation commercialization decisions. I suggested that external
commercialization may mitigate this compromise. In the next section I introduce external
commercialization, framing it as a real option on the underlying investment in innovation.
External Commercialization
External commercialization introduces a broader set of alternatives for exercising the
option to commercialize an innovation. For example, the firm may commercialize an innovation
outside the firm through mechanisms such as outlicensing, sale of intellectual property rights,
corporate venturing, or spin offs (Arora, Fosfuri & Gambardella, 2004; Grindley & Teece, 1997).
External commercialization enables exercise of the innovation option without full investment in
commercialization (McGrath, 1997). It also allows the firm to realize revenue and recoup R&D
investment on innovations that might otherwise not be commercialized within the firm
(Chesbrough, 2003; Rivette & Kline, 2000).
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Thus, considering external commercialization options increases the option value on
innovation by increasing the upside potential while limiting downside risk and decreasing the
chance of error (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001). Specifically, it activates an additional range of
outcomes, increasing the variance of outcomes on the upside and therefore the value of the
option (McGrath, 1997; Myers, 1977). Further, it capitalizes on the advantages of a sequence of
nested options that are enacted/emergent over time as both endogenous and exogenous
uncertainties are reduced (Kim & Kogut, 1996). Finally, it relaxes constraints on the
idiosyncratic value of the option to the focal firm by considering commercialization avenues
outside firm boundaries (Teece et al., 1997; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2008). However, further
guidance is needed to understand what conditions prompt a firm to exercise an external
commercialization option. The logic to address these questions of external commercialization
and implications for firm performance is provided by the appropriability framework (Teece,
1986) which I discuss in the next section.
Appropriability Framework
“In reality, however, an innovation at its early stages – consisting perhaps of
an invention plus some ideas about its application – presents a rich variety of
potentials, a set of options that might be pursued in diverse ways. This range of
meaning for what the innovation is, has much to do with the range of
appropriability strategies available to the innovator” (Winter, 2006: p. 1104).
Teece (1986) introduced the appropriability framework in his seminal work on Profiting
from Innovation. Appropriability refers to how value generated by the innovation is distributed
among the innovating firm and other entities in the industry such as rivals, imitators, suppliers or
customers (Ceccagnoli, 2009; Teece, 1986; Winter, 2006). The appropriability framework
(Teece, 1986) identifies conditions which influence the extent to which the innovating firm will
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appropriate value from its own innovation. The framework proposed that innovating firms would
appropriate value based on: 1) the degree of control over complementary assets, 2) the strength
of the appropriability regime (the extent of IP protection), and 3) market timing (environmental
uncertainty).
Complementary assets are the processes, resources, and related products and services
necessary to commercialize the focal innovation (Teece, 1986). Complementary assets may be
controlled by the innovating firm or by other firms including rivals, suppliers, customers or
providers of related products and services (Tripsas, 1997). The extent of the firm’s control over
complementary assets determines the value that the innovating firm will appropriate relative to
other firms, with greater control resulting in higher appropriation for the innovating firm (Teece,
1986).

Table 2.4 Predictions from the Appropriability Framework

Appropriability
Dimensions

High Appropriation by the
Innovating Firm

Low Appropriation by the
Innovating Firm

Degree of control over
complementary assets

High control over
complementary assets

Low control over
complementary assets

Strength of appropriability
regime

Strong appropriability
regime

Weak appropriability regime

Low uncertainty associated
with market timing

High uncertainty associated
with market timing

Market timing/ level of
uncertainty

The appropriability regime is “the protection afforded the innovator by intellectual
property protection and natural barriers to imitation” (Pisano & Teece, 2007: p. 279). The
strength of the appropriability regime influences the value that the innovating firm will
appropriate relative to other firms, with stronger appropriability regimes favoring higher
appropriation by the innovating firm (Cohen et al., 2000; Teece, 1986).
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The market timing component of the appropriability framework captures the influence of
environmental uncertainty on appropriability (Teece, 1986). For example the emergence of a
dominant design or technology in the product market (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975), the size
and growth of market demand and competitive rivalry are all uncertainties that influence the
innovating firm’s ability to appropriate value from its own innovation (Pisano & Teece, 2007).
The dimensions of the appropriability framework and the general prediction for appropriation by
the innovating firm are summarized in Table 2.4
Summary
This chapter began with a review of real options theory. The key tenets of irreversibility,
uncertainty and managerial flexibility undergird the premise of real option value; namely, the
ability to increase potential gain while limiting downside loss. Real options are created by an
initial investment in a project that provides the firm preferential access to opportunity in the
future. Once created, managers have the flexibility to hold, exercise or abandon the option. Real
options apply to investments in innovation which occur in environments of uncertainty. Because
not all outcomes can be predicted ex-ante, incremental investments in innovation yield a series of
nested options.
Next, I illustrated how introducing the option to commercialize the innovation externally
had a twofold effect: first, increasing the value of the option by increasing the number of
alternatives for profiting from the innovation, second, reducing the hazards of option traps by
introducing commercialization options outside firm boundaries. Finally, I introduced the
appropriability framework. Appropriability conditions of complementary assets, appropriability
regime (intellectual property protection) and market timing/uncertainty influence the firm’s
ability to profit from innovation.

31

In the next section I map the appropriability framework (complementary assets,
appropriability regime and market timing) onto the tenets of real options theory (irreversibility,
uncertainty and managerial flexibility) to develop the theoretical model which informs the two
research questions in this dissertation. 1. What conditions influence the extent to which a firm
engages in external commercialization? 2. To what extent does external commercialization
influence firm performance?
Theoretical Model
The foundation for the theoretical model is real options theory. Real options theory
provides a heuristic for decision making under uncertainty. In the literature review I identified
three tenets of real options theory: irreversibility of investment, uncertainty and managerial
flexibility (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Irreversibility of investment and uncertainty are further
delimited by the constructs introduced in the appropriability framework; specifically
complementary assets, appropriability regime and market timing (Teece, 1986). The relationship
between the tenets of real options theory and the dimensions of the appropriability framework
are highlighted in Table 2.5
The model is based on an assumption that the investment in innovation is an irreversible
investment in an underlying asset which the firm has the option to invest in further and
ultimately commercialize at some time in the future (McGrath, 1997; Miller, 2002).Whether the
asset is in the form of a patent, trade secret or tacit know-how, it constitutes valuable intellectual
property that the firm can potentially profit from (Teece, 1986). Firms that allocate resources to
research and development capability accumulate a stock of intellectual property assets and are
motivated to earn a return on this investment. Commercialization of the innovation earns a return
on the investment in innovation and contributes to overall firm performance (Hamel, 2000;
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Rosenbusch et al., 2011). The extent of the contribution to firm performance is further influenced
by the dimensions of the appropriability framework (Teece, 1986).
From a real options perspective an investment in complementary assets is also an
irreversible investment made by the innovating firm. Successful commercialization of the focal
innovation often requires complementary assets which the firm may or may not already own
(Teece, 1986; Tripsas, 1997). For example, investment in a chemical plant may be required to
produce and commercialize a patented compound on a large scale (Fosfuri, 2006). The
appropriability framework predicts that the firms control over complementary assets influences
the extent to which it is likely to appropriate value from its own innovation such that low control
over complementary assets diminishes the level of appropriability (Teece, 1986).
The dimensions of uncertainty in this real options model are also provided by the
appropriability framework; specifically the appropriability regime and market timing. The
appropriability regime is the strength of intellectual property protection or barriers to imitation
available to the innovating firm (Pisano & Teece, 2007). Although formal intellectual property
protection laws are present, limitations and loopholes in rules and enforcements introduce
uncertainty regarding whether the innovating firm will be able to protect its innovation (Cohen et
al., 2000). The appropriability framework proposes a direct relationship between the
appropriability regime (strength of intellectual property protection) and the ability of the
innovating firm to appropriate profits from the innovation. Overall, a weak appropriability
regime enables competitors to imitate and appropriate a relatively large share of profits away
from the innovating firm.
The market timing dimension of the appropriability framework captures how
environmental uncertainty influences whether or not firms are likely to appropriate profits from
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innovation (Teece, 1986). For example the emergence of a dominant technology in the product
market, the size and growth of demand and competitive rivalry are all external uncertainties that
influence the timing with which the firm may exercise their option (Pisano & Teece, 2007).
Firms holding an option on valuable intellectual property may adjust the timing of the exercise,
trading off the benefit of uncertainty reduction with the risk of competitive preemption (Bowman
& Hurry, 1993; Jacobides et al., 2006). The appropriability framework demonstrates how the
uncertainty captured by market timing influences the level of appropriation garnered by the
innovating firm. Broadly speaking, higher levels of uncertainty imply lower levels of
appropriation for the innovating firm.
While the appropriability framework makes general predictions about the share of value
that will accrue to the innovating firm, it also suggest that managers may influence the level of
appropriability by selecting contingent strategies. Therefore managerial flexibility, the third tenet
of real options theory, is proposed as an intervening variable in the model.
Table 2.5 Mapping the Appropriability Framework to Real Options Theory
Real Options Theory

Appropriability
Framework

Irreversibility

Uncertainty

• Innovation
• Complementary
assets

• Market timing
• Appropriability
regime

Managerial flexibility

• Commercialization
strategy

Managerial flexibility is expressed in the manager’s selection of commercialization
strategy. Managers have flexibility to choose from internal and/or external commercialization
options (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2008).
The theoretical model is shown in Figure 2.1. The choice of commercialization strategy
will be influenced by the appropriability conditions; specifically, irreversible investment in
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complementary assets and the uncertainty associated with the appropriability regime and market
timing. Accordingly, managers will select a commercialization strategy that enhances the level of
appropriation for the innovating firm (Jacobides et al., 2006; Pisano & Teece, 2007). Therefore
the commercialization strategy mediates the appropriability conditions impact on firm
performance. This model depicts the commercialization strategy as a mediator of the relationship
between appropriability conditions and firm performance in an integrated model of real options
theory and the appropriability framework. The hypotheses in the next section explicate each of
the appropriability conditions and demonstrate how the choice of commercialization strategy
under these conditions influences firm performance.
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Figure 2.1 Real Options and External Commercialization
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Firm Performance

Hypotheses Development
In this section I hypothesize that each of the dimensions of the appropriability
framework, complementary assets, appropriability regime, and market timing/uncertainty,
influences the selection of a contingent commercialization strategy and firm performance.
Specifically, an external commercialization strategy mediates the relationship between the
appropriability conditions and firm performance. These relationships are depicted in Figure 2.1
and the logic is provided under each sub-heading in this section.
Complementary Assets
Complementary assets is one dimension of the appropriability framework (Teece, 1986).
Innovations rarely stand alone; more often than not, they must be accompanied by
complementary assets to capture value. Drawing from Teece (1986; 2006), I define
complementary assets as the processes, resources, and related products and services necessary to
commercialize the focal innovation. Complementary assets may be controlled by the innovating
firm or by other firms including rivals, suppliers, customers or providers of related products and
services. The extent of the firm’s control over complementary assets determines the value that
the innovating firm will appropriate relative to other firms.
However, it is unlikely that the innovating firm will control all of the complementary
assets it needs (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). If the needed complementary assets are generic, i.e.,
multi-purpose and widely available in the market, the innovating firm can retain a high degree of
control and stay well-positioned to appropriate value from the innovation. In contrast, specialized
complementary assets have high value with respect to the innovation but relatively low value
outside this complementary role. Therefore investments in specialized complementary assets
involve higher risk because of the dependence on the focal innovation (Teece, 1986).
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Additionally, innovating firms often lack the knowledge or resources to develop or acquire
specialized complementary assets, or cannot do so with sufficient urgency (McGrath, 1997;
Pisano & Teece, 2007) and must therefore rely on other firms to provide specialized
complementary assets. By doing so, the innovating firm must relinquish a degree of control, and
some share of the profits, from the innovation (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). As an extreme case of
specialized complementary assets are bottleneck assets. These are necessary, non-substitutable,
and in limited supply (Teece, 1986), which means the provider of the bottleneck assets has a high
degree of control over those assets (Pisano & Teece, 2007). Moreover, an innovating firm that
needs access to the bottleneck assets must share a portion of their innovation’s value with the
firm that controls the bottleneck assets (Pisano & Teece, 2007). Thus, the firm’s control over
complementary assets and consequent share of appropriability depends on the specialization as
well as the ownership of the complementary asset.
The link between complementary assets and appropriability is supported by evidence that
complementary assets are more effective in appropriating value from innovation than is patent
protection (Cohen et al., 2000). Accordingly, innovating firms with less control over
complementary assets are challenged to seek alternative strategies for appropriating value from
the innovation (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006). External commercialization strategies may benefit
innovating firms with limited control over complementary assets that still hope to preserve
appropriation from innovation. Indeed, research confirms that firms with less control over
complementary assets have a higher propensity to license innovations (Arora & Ceccagnoli,
2006).
Through a deliberate external commercialization strategy, innovating firms can benefit
from leveraging another firm’s superior position in complementary assets in at least three ways
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(Chesbrough, 2003). First, the presence of the complementary assets expands the market for the
innovation, creating more value to be distributed among the innovating firm as well as the firms
providing complementary assets (Jacobides et al., 2006). Second, proactively linking the focal
innovation to the complementary assets of other firms allows those firms to appropriate value
from the innovation, discouraging potential imitation (Teece & Pisano, 2007). Finally,
leveraging other firms’ complementary assets enables the innovating firm to allocate scarce
resources to the focal innovation while sharing the risk of investment in complementary assets
with other firms (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). Thus, innovating firms that exploit the complementary
assets of other firms through external commercialization strategies are likely to increase their
share of profits from innovation and enhance firm performance. Therefore I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive relationship between complementary assets
and firm performance.
Hypothesis 1b: The commercialization decision mediates the positive
relationship between complementary assets and firm performance. Specifically,
less control over complementary assets will lead to increased levels of external
commercialization and subsequent increased firm performance.

Appropriability Regime
Following complementary assets, the appropriability is a second dimension of the
appropriability framework (Teece, 1986). The appropriability regime is defined as “the
protection afforded the innovator by intellectual property protection and natural barriers to
imitation” (Pisano & Teece, 2007: p. 279). The strength of the appropriability regime in an
industry is determined by the industry participants’ use of patents, trade secrets, and natural
barriers to imitation to protect their innovations (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000).
Appropriability regimes vary widely across industries and range from tight, in which innovators
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enjoy a high degree of protection, to weak, in which innovators experience lower levels of
protection (Teece, 1986).
Tight appropriability regimes offer high levels of protection for innovators through the
use of patents, trade secrets, and natural barriers to imitation. Firms in industries with tight
appropriability regimes have high rates of patenting and protect their innovations with aggressive
patenting strategies (Cohen et al., 2000). For example, firms may use a patent blocking strategy
by securing patents for their innovations as well as any related and substitute technologies,
effectively creating a patent fence around the area of the innovation to preempt imitation by
competitors (Cohen et al., 2000). Cross-licensing agreements that provide reciprocal access to
technology among industry participants, who are often competitors, also motivate aggressive
patenting in an industry because firms need strong patent stocks to increase their bargaining
power in cross-licensing negotiations and disputes (Grindley & Teece, 1997).
When legal patent protections are not necessary or obtainable (Cohen et al., 2000), firms
in industries with tight appropriability regimes can also use trade secrets and natural barriers to
imitation to protect their innovations. Trade secrets are effective in protecting products such as
chemical compounds or recipes that are difficult to imitate or reverse engineer after they are
released in the market; thus, trade secrets are preferred over patents when the amount of
information disclosed in the patent facilitates rather than prevents imitation (Cohen et al., 2000).
Alternatively, natural barriers to imitation are inherent in the innovation itself; for example,
process innovations tend to be inimitable because they are tightly linked to other firm capabilities
and are not readily observable (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Ettlie & Reza, 1992). The
protections offered by patents, trade secrets, and natural barriers to imitation in tight
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appropriability regimes allow firms a high level of appropriation of profits from innovation and
subsequent contribution to firm performance (Teece, 1986).
In contrast, weak appropriability regimes offer less protection from patents, trade secrets,
and natural barriers to imitation (Nelson, 2006). Several conditions contribute to deficiencies in
intellectual property protection. Lack of novelty is one reason that patents are either not sought
or denied. When granted, the patent often covers a narrow area leaving room for imitators to
invent around the scope of protection (Cohen et al., 2000). The expense of application,
maintenance and enforcement of patents is another barrier to full patent protection, particularly
for firms with limited resources (Gans & Stern, 2010). Additionally, trade secrets are not
effective for products that can be easily reverse-engineered and many products do not have the
inimitable characteristics common to process innovations (Leiponen & Byrma, 2009). Thus,
innovating firms operating in environments with weak appropriability regimes have few
protections available to them and often experience rapid imitation through which rivals may
quickly appropriate profits (Teece, 1986). Thus innovating firms operating in weak
appropriability regimes are less likely to accrue performance benefits from innovation than those
in tight appropriability regimes.
Innovating firms that enjoy the protection afforded by tight appropriability regimes are
able to appropriate profits from innovation through traditional vertically integrated
commercialization. Indeed, firms using patent blocking strategies typical under conditions of
tight appropriability regimes were found to be less likely to license their intellectual property
(Motohashi, 2008). However, firms operating in weak appropriability regimes cannot rely on
intellectual property protection to appropriate profit from innovation. Innovators challenged by
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weak appropriability regimes may increase their profits from innovation by pursuing an external
commercialization strategy (Chesbrough, 2003).
External commercialization allows the innovator to appropriate value in several ways.
First, the innovator receives direct licensing revenue. Second, more market participants helps
stimulate demand for the innovation, expanding the rate of growth and size of the market. Third,
providing access to the technology through deliberate licensing pre-empts accidental spillover
and deters competitive imitation. In effect, the external commercialization strategy enables the
innovating firm to secure a position in the industry that allows continued appropriation of a
portion of the profit from innovation while facilitating appropriation by others. Under conditions
of a weak appropriability regime, an external commercialization strategy enables appropriation
of profit from innovation which contributes to enhanced firm performance. Therefore I
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2a: There is a positive relationship between appropriability regime
and firm performance.
Hypothesis 2b: The commercialization decision mediates the positive
relationship between the appropriability regime and firm performance.
Specifically, a weaker appropriability regime will lead to increased levels of
external commercialization and subsequent increased firm performance.

Market Timing
Market timing is the third appropriability condition in the framework (Teece, 1986) and
manifests the uncertainty underlying real options theory (Bowman & Hurry, 1983; McGrath,
1997). Market timing includes the presence or absence of a dominant technology or design
(Utterback & Abernathy, 1975), the size and growth of the market (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven,
1996) and competitive rivalry (Derfus, Maggitti, Grimm & Smith, 2008; Porter, 1985). The
degree to which the innovating firm can potentially profit from innovation is influenced by these
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sources of environmental uncertainty (Teece 1986). Environmental uncertainty refers to “the
extent to which future states of the environment can be anticipated or accurately predicted”
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986: p. 445). Two dimensions of environmental uncertainty that are
relevant to innovation are environmental dynamism and environmental complexity (Dess &
Beard, 1984; Duncan, 1972; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996).
Environmental dynamism. Environmental dynamism is defined as the relative stability
versus instability in the industry and is often described as turbulence (Aldrich, 1979; Dess &
Beard, 1984). Dynamism refers to unpredictability in the rate and magnitude of change in the
external environment (Duncan, 1972; Reus et al., 2009).
Environments high in dynamism are those in which “changes in demand, competition,
and technology are rapid and discontinuous” (Eisenhardt, 1989: p. 544). Technology changes are
characteristic of new/product markets, industry and technological convergence and disruptive
innovations (Thompson, 1967; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). The early stages of technological
innovation involve a good deal of experimentation and trial and error by industry participants
prior to the emergence of a dominant design (Teece, 1986; Utterback & Abernathy, 1975). High
rates of industry entry and exit during this period make changes in the competitive structure
unpredictable (Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984). Accordingly, the size and timing of demand,
demand preferences and demand shifts between rivals are also unpredictable (Eisenhardt &
Schoonhoven, 1996; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Dynamism is typically higher in the early
stages of product/market development before settling down through technical effort and the
passage of time (McGrath, 1997; Miller & Friesen, 1984). Conversely, environmental dynamism
is generally lower in later stages of the product/market life cycle. A dominant design has
emerged and technological innovations evolve around this dominant design (Teece, 1986;
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Utterback & Abernathy, 1975). Industry architectures are well defined and market shares are
relatively stable (Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984). Likewise, demand growth and preferences are
more predictable (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996).
Recent evidence from the competitive dynamics literature shows that environmental
dynamism, as well as complexity, contributes to volatility in firm performance (D’Aveni et al.,
2010; Thomas & D’Aveni, 2009). As dynamism increases industry leaders enjoy shorter periods
of superior performance and fall more frequently from their top positions (Derfus et al., 2008;
Wiggins & Ruefli, 2005). Studies suggest that dynamism, complexity and volatility in
performance have increased and spread across industries over time (Thomas & D’Aveni, 2009;
Wiggins & Ruefli, 2002). In these environments a repertoire of innovation strategies, like other
competitive moves, are critical to firm performance (Chesbrough et al., 2006; Chen, Katila,
McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2010; Miller & Chen, 1996). Indeed, firms in dynamic environments
have been shown to create more options for innovation through R&D investments (Chen et al.,
2010). By extension, firms are also likely to expand their options for commercialization of
innovation through external commercialization strategies.
Dynamic environments offer a unique opportunity for innovating firms to shape the
emerging technical and competitive dynamics of the industry in their favor (Santos & Eisenhardt,
2009). External commercialization is one mechanism to achieve this (Jacobides et al., 2006;
Pisano & Teece, 2007). Indeed, scholars propose that environmental dynamism increases the rate
of inter-firm cooperation (Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007). Findings confirm that innovating firms
operating in turbulent industries are more likely to engage in deliberate external
commercialization (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). Likewise, technical uncertainty
stimulates demand for these innovations among industry participants (Arora & Gambardella,
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2010a; Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2009; Rothaermel, Hitt & Jobe, 2006). Conversely, innovating
firms in stable environments have less opportunity to influence technological, competitive and
demand factors that are well established (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). Similarly, firms
that dominate these stable industries have little incentive to proactively pull potentially disruptive
innovations and new entrants into the mainstream of the industry (Christensen, 1997; Tushman
& Anderson, 1986). Therefore innovating firms are more likely to pursue external
commercialization strategies in turbulent rather than in stable environments.
External commercialization strategies enable innovating firms in turbulent environments
to influence the dominant technical design and architecture of the industry (Eisenhardt &
Schoonhoven, 1996; McGrath, 1997; Jacobides et al., 2006; Teece, 1986; Tushman & Anderson,
1986). Innovating firms that make their innovation available to industry participants through an
external commercialization strategy stimulate further development around their technology
platform and thus increase the likelihood that the firm’s technology will emerge as the dominant
design (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001; McGrath, 1997; Jacobides et al., 2006). In turn a broad base
of support from industry participants may drive adoption of the innovating firm’s technology in
specifications of industry standards (Chesbrough, 2003; Teece, 2006). Access to the innovating
firm’s technology, granted through external commercialization agreements, will influence the
extent to which industry participants choose to compete and/or occupy a position in the
innovation value chain (Jacobides et al., 2006). Thus, the external commercialization strategy
enables the innovating firm to secure a central position in the dominant design and industry
architecture (Chesbrough, 2007; Pisano & Teece, 2007). Therefore I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between environmental dynamism
and external commercialization.
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Environmental complexity. Another component of environmental uncertainty is
complexity. Environmental complexity refers to the number, similarity and relatedness of the
environmental elements affecting the firm (Dess & Beard, 1984; Duncan, 1972). One of the most
important elements of a firm’s environment is other firms (Lawless & Anderson, 1996). For
example, industry concentration takes into account the number of competitors, distribution of
size and market share, and the range of product/market segments in the industry (Keats & Hitt,
1988; Porter, 1980).
Less complex environments have higher industry concentration, with few firms holding a
large share of the market in a well defined industry (Keats & Hitt, 1988; Eisenhardt &
Schoonhoven, 1996). The industry structure is well established and dominated by powerful firms
that impose order on competitive rivalry across the industry (Porter, 1980). Therefore less
complex industries have lower uncertainty (Dess & Beard, 1984). In contrast, more complex
environments have lower industry concentration, with numerous well balanced rivals competing
vigorously for market share (Porter, 1980). The scope of the industry tends to be diverse and
segmented, and the boundaries of the industry are more fluid (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996;
Lawless & Anderson, 1996; Porter, 1980). Thus there is higher uncertainty in these industries
(Dess & Beard, 1984).
Environmental complexity, similar to dynamism discussed in Hypothesis 3, increases the
volatility of firm performance (D’Aveni, 1994; Thomas & D’Aveni, 2009; Wiggins & Ruefli,
2005). Likewise a broader repertoire of innovation strategies is required to sustain performance
in these environments (Miller & Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 2010). Thus, the level of environmental
complexity influences the propensity for firms to pursue external innovation strategies
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2002; Powell, 1990).

46

External commercialization strategies in less complex environments are likely to be
shaped by the structure of the industry with firms on the periphery seeking agreements with
industry leaders (Ahuja, 2000; Powell, Koput & Smith-Doerr, 1996). However, industry leaders
may have little incentive to cooperate with other firms that do not offer advantages that the
leading firm does not already control. If agreements are made, for example in the case of access
to a novel technology, the leading firm is likely to leverage superior bargaining power to secure
favorable terms (Ahuja, 2000; Powell et al., 1996). Evidence confirms that less complex
environments with less uncertainty have fewer inter-firm agreements for innovation (Eisenhardt
& Schoonhoven, 1996; Shan, 1990). In these industries the agreements follow a hub and spoke
pattern with large firms at the center (Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007). Therefore, I expect
innovating firms in less complex environments to engage in external commercialization
agreements less frequently.
Conversely in more complex and highly uncertain environments innovating firms are
under intense competitive and performance pressure and technical knowledge and access to
markets is distributed among many firms in multiple segments of the industry (Porter, 1980;
Powell et al., 1996). Innovating firms in complex environments are more motivated to engage in
external commercialization of innovations for several reasons. First, there is a balance between
firms in the industry such that there are likely to be incentives and opportunities for both parties
to form an agreement (Ahuja, 2000; Chesbrough, 2007). Second, external commercialization,
like other innovation agreements, can enhance performance resilience in these highly
competitive markets (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). Findings show that more complex
environments with higher uncertainty increase the number inter-firm agreements for innovation
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2002). The patterns of these
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agreements are more web-like with multiple nodes, and multiple relationships per firm
(Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007). Therefore I expect innovating firms in highly complex
environments to engage in external commercialization agreements more frequently. Therefore I
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between environmental complexity
and external commercialization.

Chapter 2 began with a review of the literature on real options theory and introduced the
appropriability framework. Next, the theoretical model integrating real options and the
appropriability framework explained why firms may engage in external commercialization and
the expected impact on firm performance. Finally, testable hypotheses were developed. The next
chapter provides an overview of the methods used to test these hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 3 METHODS
This Chapter describes the methodology used to test the hypotheses. The sample and data
sources are identified followed by a description of the variables and measurement. The chapter
concludes with an overview of the statistical analysis used to test the data.
Sample and Data Sources
Sample
The sample includes firms in the manufacturing sector with primary two-digit SIC codes
between 20 and 39 (Cohen et al., 2000; Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2009; Schilling & Steensma,
2001). A comprehensive study period from 1990 – 2006 was selected. The sample was drawn
from the Compustat database which contains accounting and financial data for firms traded on a
North American exchange. I included data for firms designated on Compustat as both active and
inactive to reduce survival bias. This allowed firms that entered and exited during the extended
study period to be included in the sample. The initial set of 4,901 firms was screened to include
firms that had reported the minimum seven years performance data required to measure prior and
lagged performance in the study. This produced an initial sample frame of 2,895 firms from the
Compustat database. The higher than anticipated incidence of missing data in the Compustat
database resulted in elimination of an additional 1245 cases and a sample size of 1650. Outliers
were diagnosed using the Cook’s D test for influence at a threshold of 4/n (Bohon, forthcoming).
This test identified 38 observations as outliers and 32 of these were omitted from the analysis.
The final sample used in the analysis included 1618 firms in 11 industries. The distribution of
industries represented in the sample is shown in table 3.1.
To identify which of the 1618 sample firms had participated in external
commercialization, the sample was matched against the firm-level external commercialization
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Table 3.1 Distribution of Sample Firms by Industry
Industry
Apparel and fabric products
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals
Concrete, stone, glass & related
Electronic components
Fabricated metals
Food and kindred products
Machinery and computers
Paper and allied products
Precision instruments incl. medical
Rubber and plastics
Transportation equipment
Total

SIC
23
28
32
36
34
20
35
26
38
30
37

Percent
2.3
22.5
1.5
21.8
2.4
4.8
17.4
2.6
17.0
2.5
5.1
100

data constructed from the SDC database. This data included 1438 firms that had participated in at
least one external commercialization agreement during the study period. (Details of how this
data was constructed are provided in the in the next section under the variable description for
external commercialization). A total of 318 (19.7%) firms were matched using this procedure.
Thus, the final sample of 1618 firms included 318 (19.7%) that had participated in external
commercialization agreements during the study period from 1990 -2006. The number of external
commercialization agreements per firm ranged from 1 to 32. The frequency of external
commercialization agreements for the sample is shown in Table 3.3.
Data Sources
The dataset for this study was compiled from multiple archival sources including the Thomson
Reuters SDC Platinum Joint Ventures and Alliances database, National Bureau of Economic
Research Patent Data Project (PDP) and Compustat. Additional data is accessed from the
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), U.S. Census Bureau Center for Economic
Studies (CES) and U.S. Census of Manufacturers. These data sources are described below and
summarized in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2 Frequency of External
Commercialization Agreements
Number of
Number Percent of
Agreements
of Firms
Firms
0
1300
80.3
1
172
10.6
2
75
4.6
3
26
1.6
4 or more
45
2.8
Total
1618
100.0

SDC Platinum. The Statistical Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum database Joint
Ventures and Alliances Module contains alliance information which is used in studies of
alliances and innovation published in top strategic management journals (Anand & Khanna,
2009; Hagedoorn, Lorenz-Orlean & Van Kranenburg, 2009; Schilling, 2009; Steensma &
Schilling, 2001). The SDC Platinum database contains global securities and financial data for
publicly traded firms. The Joint Ventures and Alliances Module is of most interest in this study.
This data reports a wide range of alliances including joint ventures, manufacturing and marketing
agreements, licensing agreements and more, and can be filtered by alliance characteristics. Each
alliance also reports “deal text”, a synopsis which contains a detailed description of the
agreement. According to Schilling (2009), the database contains more than 52,000 research or
technology alliances from 1990 – 2005, and at least one alliance for each of 1,059 four-digit SIC
codes. One noted caution of this database is that of underreporting (Hagedoorn et al., 2009).
Although the database is compiled from an array of original sources including SEC filings, trade
publications and news wires, most alliance types are not subject to mandatory reporting.
Therefore the data likely represents a sample rather than a census of agreements. However, in a
2009 study comparing the most commonly used alliance datasets Schilling concluded that
“These results provide some reassurance that even though each database only captures a sample
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of alliance activity, it may yield reliable results for many - if not all- research purposes” (2009: p.
258). Details on how this data was used to construct the external commercialization variable are
provided in the next section.
NBER. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Patent Data Project (PDP)
database matches patent and patent citation data from the USPTO to Compustat North America
data (Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2001). NBER also publishes The Total Factor Productivity Index
(TFP) used to measure the rate of technological change in this study.
U.S. Census of Manufacturers. The U.S. Census of Manufacturers provides periodic
and comprehensive statistics about manufacturing establishments, activities, and production.
Industry concentration ratios for the measurement of environmental complexity are extracted
from this data.
Compustat. The Compustat North America database contains accounting and financial
data for publicly traded firm in North America. Compustat data is used for measures of firm
performance, R&D intensity, volatility, munificence and firm size.
Variables and Measures
The dependent, independent and control variables are described in this section. The
mediator variable of interest - external commercialization - is treated as a count variable as
discussed below. Each of the variable measures and data sources is summarized in Table 3.3.
Dependent Variable: Firm Performance
Firm Performance is measured by Return on Assets (ROA) computed at a four year time
lag from the base year (Combs, Crook & Shook, 2005; Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986). The
base year for performance measurement is the year of external commercialization, or the median
year for firms that had multiple agreements. For firms that did not engage in external
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commercialization the base years for performance were distributed to align with those of the
external commercialization firms.
Independent Variables
In this section the measures for complementary assets, appropriability regime and
environmental dynamism and complexity are described.
Complementary assets. Complementary assets are measured by a count of the number
of 4 digit SIC codes for the firm. A larger number of SIC codes indicates that the firm is likely to
have complementary resources and capabilities that enhance the ability to appropriate value from
commercialization of innovation. For example, a manufacturer of electronic medical equipment
for imaging (SIC 3844) may also develop software to operate the equipment (SIC 7372) and
precision mechanical instruments for the procedure (SIC 3841). A count rather than a distance
measure was employed because the proximity or distance between the secondary and primary
SIC codes do not necessarily indicate more or less complementarity, as evidenced by the
previous example.
Appropriability regime. Appropriability regime was previously defined as “the
protection afforded the innovator by intellectual property protection and natural barriers to
imitation” (Pisano & Teece, 2007: p. 279). Appropriability regimes tend to be homogeneous
within industries and heterogeneous across industries (Cohen et al., 2000; Pisano & Teece,
2007). Following Arora & Ceccagnoli (2006), I constructed a measure of appropriability regimes
at the industry level based on data reported from the Carnegie Mellon Survey (CMS). The
Carnegie Mellon Survey (CMS) is a comprehensive survey of R&D managers in the
manufacturing sector (see Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, 2000 for the full report). To measure the
effectiveness of appropriability mechanisms the CMS survey asked respondents to “report the

53

percentage of innovations for which each appropriability mechanism had been effective in
protecting the firm’s competitive advantage from those innovations during the prior three years”
(Cohen et al., 2000: p. 5). The response categories were < 10 percent, 10-40 percent, 41-60
percent, 61-90 percent and > 90 percent. The CMS data was collected for six different
appropriability mechanisms- complementary assets for sales and service, complementary assets
for manufacturing, lead time, patents, secrecy and other legal means - these are not mutually
exclusive categories and the percentages need not sum to 100 percent. Product and process
innovations were tallied separately reported in 34 ISIC (International Standard Industrial
Classification: United Nations Statistics Division) groups.
To construct the appropriability regime variable for this study, I summed the percentages
for patents, secrecy and other legal means across product and process innovations to create an
index of effectiveness of appropriability regimes for each industry category. The value for the
appropriability regime was assigned to each firm by matching the 2 or 3 digit SIC codes. The
index ranges from 59 in the printing and publishing industry (SIC 27) to 154 in the medical
equipment industry (SIC 384) with a mean of 113. A higher index indicates a stronger
appropriability regime. Although the CMS survey also included complementary assets and lead
time, these were excluded from the appropriability regime measure in this study because the
definition of appropriability regime refers specifically to the protection of intellectual property.
Environmental dynamism. Similar to the appropriability regime and following previous
literature, environmental dynamism and environmental complexity are appropriately measured at
the industry level (Dess & Beard, 1984; Keats & Hitt, 1988). Environmental dynamism is
indicated by the volatility as well as the rate of technological change in an industry (Dess &
Beard, 1984; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Keats & Hitt, 1988). Volatility is measured as
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the standard error of the regression slope coefficient of annual revenue for all sample firms in an
industry in the five years preceding the base year (Boyd, 1995; Goll & Rasheed, 1997; Keats &
Hitt, 1988). This captures the deviation from the expected value of revenue in the industry (Dess
& Beard, 1984).
Measuring the rate of technological change in a large, multi-industry sample presents a
challenge, precluding measures of change such as rate of new product introduction or rate of firm
entry and exit that are often used in single-industry samples (Upson, Ketchen, Connelly & Ranft,
2012). Schilling & Steensma (2001) applied a novel approach to measuring the rate of
technological change in multi-industry studies. This measure is the Total Factor Productivity
(TFP) growth index (Bartelsman & Gray, 1996). The TFP growth index is calculated as the
growth rate of outputs minus the weighted growth rates of five factor inputs (capital, production
and non-production labor, materials and energy). The TFP growth index is calculated and made
available through the National Bureau of Economic Research (Becker & Gray, 2009). To align
the TFP index with the relevant study period I averaged the TFP growth index from 1990
through 2005 and then assigned the index to firm-level data based on 2 or 3 digit SIC codes.
Environmental complexity. Consistent with the definition and previous research I use
competitive intensity as a proxy for environmental complexity (Dess & Beard, 1984; Eisenhardt
& Schoonhoven, 1996; Keats & Hitt, 1988). Competitive intensity is measured as an index of the
four firm concentration ratio (Ceccagnoli, 2009; Schilling & Steensma, 2001). This measure is
taken From The 1997 U.S. Census Of Manufacturers.
Mediating Variable: External Commercialization
I previously defined external commercialization as an organization’s deliberate
commercialization of technological knowledge to an outside organization, exclusively or in
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addition to its internal application. Data for the external commercialization variable was obtained
from the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum Database. A broad query for all types of agreements
that involved firms in the manufacturing sector during the period 1990-2006 returned 10,758
agreements. The data contained fields to indicate whether the agreement involved technology
transfer and whether it included one or a combination of research and development, marketing,
manufacturing or other types of activities. The “deal text” also provided a description of each
agreement.
The description for each agreement was examined to determine whether the agreement
was external commercialization or some other type of agreement and identify which party to the
agreement transferred the technology. I applied conservative inclusion rules to avoid
confounding external commercialization with myriad other types of co-operative agreements
between firms. Principal among these inclusion rules was that the agreement must involve
technology transfer. Technology transfer agreements may use alliance, licensing, joint venture,
spin-out or other mechanisms and may also be embedded in a manufacturing or research and
development agreement. Technology transfer agreements were typically identified by
descriptions such as “entered into a license agreement, granted a license to use, received the right
to use” or “contributed it’s technology.”
Agreements that did not include technology transfer were excluded from the
operationalization of external commercialization. These agreements include brand licensing,
contract manufacturing, OEM, and distribution agreements. Agreements that focused principally
on operations were also excluded. These were usually described in the data as “joint venture to
build and operate” or “joint venture to manufacture” (in a specific country) or “provide
telecommunications services” in a country or region. Likewise, agreements that focused on
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research and development described as “jointly develop” without further specification of
technology transfer were considered research and development agreements only and therefore
excluded from the agreements identified as external commercialization.
Several other types of agreements were excluded. For example, agreements that were
strictly for software licensing it were excluded. I also excluded cross-licensing agreements in the
telecommunications industry commonly known as “license pools” aimed at interoperability
standards across providers and devices. Agreements in which technology was transferred from a
not for profit research organization or government entity were also excluded. Although these
agreements are considered technology transfer they were excluded from this study because the
analysis is concerned with financial performance outcomes.
Of the 10,758 agreements that were returned by the initial search query, 2312 were
considered external commercialization agreements. These agreements were then aggregated to
the firm level resulting in a sample of 1438 manufacturing firms that had participated in at least
one external commercialization agreement during the study period. These firms were then
matched to the sample according to the procedure described previously. The external
commercialization variable is operationalized as a count of the number of agreements the firm
entered into during the study period 1990-2006.
Control Variables
A necessary but not sufficient condition for a firm to engage in external
commercialization of innovation is that the firm own valuable technological knowledge that it
can market to other firms. Technological knowledge may exist in the form of protected
intellectual property such as patents. However, patent strategies and the propensity to patent vary
across industries (Cohen et al., 2000). Therefore a simple patent count may underestimate the
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store of knowledge assets a firm possesses. Therefore, I use measures of patents and R&D
intensity to capture a more comprehensive measure of knowledge assets (Heeley, Matusik &
Jain, 2007). Patents are measured by the number of patents assigned to the firm during the study
period. The data is obtained from the NBER, Patent Data Project (PDP) database (Hall et al.,
2001).
A control for alliances was included to control for the firm’s propensity to form alliances
of any type. Alliances is measured as a count variable of the total number of alliances formed by
the focal firm during the study period, excluding those already classified as external
commercialization. Data for the alliances was taken from the SDC Platinum database
(Hagedoorn et al., 2009; Schilling & Steensma, 2001).
Environmental munificence refers to the availability of resources in the environment for
growth (Dess & Beard, 1984; Sirmon, Hitt, Arregle & Campbell, 2010). Munificence is
operationalized as a growth measure computed as the regression slope coefficient of annual
revenue for all firms in an industry using time lagged for five years following the base year as
the independent variable (Boyd, 1995; Dess & Beard, 1984; Goll & Rasheed, 1997; Keats &
Hitt, 1988).
Prior performance is measured by ROA, calculated as a two-year average prior to the
base year (Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2009). Firm size is measured by the number of employees
in the base year. Firm age is calculated as the difference between the base year and founding
year.
Statistical Analysis
The theoretical model specifies firm performance as the dependent variable and external
commercialization as a mediator. Therefore I applied the Baron & Kenny (1986) recommended
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approach to test for mediation. The hypothesis tests were conducted primarily using an ordinary
least squares (OLS) approach with hierarchical loading (Hair, Black, Babin & Anderson, 2009).
The exception to this was the test for the direct relationship between the independent variables
and the mediator external commercialization.
External commercialization is a count variable with nearly 20% (318) of cases having at
least one external commercialization agreement and 80% (1300) of cases having no external
commercialization agreements. A Poisson regression is often the preferred method of analysis
for count data (Tang He & Tu, 2012). However, the large number of zeros causes the
distribution for external commercialization to be strongly skewed to the right, violating the
assumption of the Poisson distribution for the mean and variance to be equal. The variance of
external commercialization is more than five times larger than the mean indicating
overdispersion in the distribution of the data. That is, greater variance than expected in a Poisson
distribution. In cases of overdispersion the negative binomial regression is often more
appropriate (Long & Freese, 2006).
The zero inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression is an extension of the standard
negative binomial method. The zero inflated method assumes that zeros result from two
different processes. Structural or excess zeros are present because there was no chance of
occurrence. For example a count of how many prizes were won would equal zero for all those
who did not purchase any raffle tickets. This is different than a “real” zero in which raffle tickets
were purchased but no prizes were won. The ZINB model has two components that predict the
distinction between real zeros (i.e., company had no commercialization agreements) and excess
zeros (i.e., company was coded zero because data were not provided) (Long & Freese, 2006).
Several tests of model fit were applied to confirm that the ZINB was the best fit for the data. The
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Vuong test compares the model fit of the standard NB with the ZINB regression (Tang et al.,
2012). The alpha test compares the NB to the Poisson regression. The Stata “countfit” command
is also useful for comparing alternative models for the data (Long & Freese, 2006).
This Chapter has outlined the methodology used to test the hypotheses in this
dissertation. The sample, data sources, variable measures and analysis were explained. The next
Chapter reports the results of this analysis.
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Table 3.3 Constructs, Measures and Data Sources
Construct/
Variable

Data
Source

Measure

Measurement
Support

Dependent Variable
Firm performance

Four year average Return on Assets (ROA)
lagged from the base year

Compustat

Ceccagnoli, 2009;
Rothaermel &
Alexandre, 2009

Independent Variables
Complementary
assets

Environmental
dynamism

Count of 4 digit SIC codes

Compustat

Volatility: standard error of the regression
slope of annual revenue for all sample firms
in a 2-digit SIC industry

Compustat

Rate of technological change: TFP growth

2002 US
Census of
Mfg.

Environmental
complexity

Concentration ratio of four largest firms in
the industry

Appropriability
regime

Effectiveness of proprietary knowledge
protection in the industry

2002 US
Census of
Mfg.
Cohen,
Nelson &
Walsh,
2000

Arora & Ceccagnoli,
2006
Keats & Hitt, 1988,
Boyd, 1995; Dess &
Beard, 1984;
Schilling & Steensma,
2001
Ceccagnoli, 2009;
Schilling & Steensma,
2001
Arora & Ceccagnoli,
2006; Ceccagnoli,
2009

Mediating Variable
External
Commercialization

Inter-firm agreements including technology
transfer from the focal firm such as
licensing, cross-licensing or spin outs.

SDC

Anand & Khanna,
2000a; Hagedoorn,
Lorenz-Orlean & van
Kranenburg, 2008;
Schilling, 2009

Control Variables
Technological
knowledge

Alliances

Munificence
Firm prior
performance
Firm size
Firm age

R&D intensity: R&D expense/Revenue
Patent count: number of patents assigned to
the firm during the study period
Count of alliances formed during the study
period, excluding external
commercialization agreements
Five year average growth of annual revenue
following the base year for all sample firms
in a 2-digit SIC industry
Two year average ROA prior to the base
year
Count number of employees
Years since founding
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Compustat
NBER

Heeley, Matusik &
Jain, 2007
Ahuja, 2000; McGrath
& Nerkar, 2004

SDC

Schilling, 2009

Compustat

Dess & Beard, 1984;
Goll & Rasheed, 1997

Compustat
Compustat
LexisNexis

Rothaermel &
Alexandre, 2009
Ceccagnoli, 2009
Ceccagnoli, 2009

CHAPTER 4 RESULTS
The results of the analysis are reported in three sections. The first section reports the
results of the hypotheses tests. The next section describes several post-hoc tests. The last section
proposes an alternative model specification.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables.
Variance inflation factors (VIF) were examined and observed to be within recommended levels
with most values less than 3 (Hair et al., 2009). The exceptions were the dummy variables
created for industry controls, four of which exceeded a VIF of 10. I concluded that
multicollinearity had little impact on the estimation results and all variables were retained in
favor of complete model specification (Wooldridge, 2009).
Results of Hypothesis Testing
The theoretical model posits that external commercialization mediates the relationship
between appropriability conditions and firm performance. These relationships were tested in the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive relationship between complementary assets
and firm performance.
Hypothesis 1b: The commercialization decision mediates the positive
relationship between complementary assets and firm performance. Specifically,
less control over complementary assets will lead to increased levels of external
commercialization and subsequent increased firm performance.
Hypothesis 2a: There is a positive relationship between appropriability regime
and firm performance.
Hypothesis 2b: The commercialization decision mediates the positive
relationship between the appropriability regime and firm performance.
Specifically, a weaker appropriability regime will lead to increased levels of
external commercialization and subsequent increased firm performance.
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Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between environmental dynamism
and external commercialization.
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between environmental complexity
and external commercialization.

The hypotheses were tested in four models (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Model 1, shown in
Table 4.2, tests the direct effects of the appropriability conditions on external commercialization
using MLE in the form of a zero inflated negative binomial method (Tang, et al., 2012). Models
2 through 4 test the remaining relationships using OLS regression and results are shown in Table
4.3. Model 2 tests the direct effect of the appropriability conditions on firm performance. Model
3 tests the direct effect of external commercialization on firm performance. Model 4 tests the
mediation effect of external commercialization on the relationship between appropriability
conditions and firm performance.
Model 1. The first step in demonstrating support for the hypothesized mediation model is
to establish a direct relationship between the appropriability conditions - complementary assets,
dynamism, complexity and appropriability regime – and the mediator, external
commercialization (Baron & Kenny, 1986). External commercialization is a count variable with
nearly 20% (318) of cases having at least one external commercialization agreement and 80%
(1300) of cases having no external commercialization agreements. Therefore a Zero Inflated
Negative Binomial (ZINB) regression model is applied. Results of the Vuong test confirm that
the ZINB is a better fit than the NB model (z=5.81; p<.001). Likewise the alpha test confirms
that NB is a better model fit than a Poisson regression (χ2=126.23; p<.001).
I applied a hierarchical approach by first entering the controls in the constrained model
(Model 1) and then adding the independent variables in the full model (Model 2). Model 3
facilitates interpretation of the coefficients from the full model as incident rate ratio (odds ratios).
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The results shown in Table 4.2 indicate that the overall model is significant (likelihood ratio χ2
= 482.14; p <.001). Yet comparison of the fit indices suggests that the control model (1) is a
better fit to the data than the full model (2). The differences for the Likelihood Ratio (6.49),
McFadden’s R2 (-.06) and BIC (67.39) all indicate support in favor of the control model over the
full model. This suggests that the incremental explanatory power of the full model was
insufficient to accommodate the loss in degrees of freedom from the addition of five predictors
into the model. To facilitate interpretation of the results the coefficient of each predictor was
transformed to an incident rate ratio (odds ratio). The incident rate ratio (irr) represents how
changes in the appropriability condition affect the rate at which external commercialization
occurs (ceteris paribus). The percent increase or decrease can be calculated as 1 – irr. Values
greater than 1 represent an increase in the likelihood of occurrence and values less than 1
represent a decrease. The results provided no support for the proposed relationships between the
appropriability conditions and external commercialization. None of the coefficients were
significant and the odds ratios are observed to be near 1.00, meaning that a change in the level of
the predictor is likely to have no impact on external commercialization activity.3 Contrary to
expectations, the consistent lack of significance suggests that appropriability conditions are not
good predictors of external commercialization activity. Therefore the mediation requirement for
a direct relationship between the predictors and the mediator is not fulfilled. The remaining
relationships are tested in Models 2–4.
Model 2. The second requirement for support of the mediation hypotheses is to show a
significant relationship between appropriability conditions and the dependent variable, firm
performance (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Results are shown in Table 4.3, Model 2. Controls were

3

One exception to is the irr for volatility z = 1.35 (ns), se = 20.29.
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Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variables

Mean

s.d.

1

2

1

Return on Assets

-.08

.30

2

Industry 20

.05

.21

.09**

3

Industry 23

.02

.15

.03

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

-.03
*

4

Industry 26

.03

.16

.06

-.04

-.02

5

Industry 28

.22

.42

-.18**

-.12**

-.82**

-.09**

6

Industry 30

.03

.16

.02

-.04

-.02

-.03

-.09**

7

Industry 34

.02

.15

.04

-.04

-.02

-.03

-.03

.17

.38

-.01

-.10

-.70

-.08

-.25**

-.07**

-.07**

9

Industry 36

.22

.41

.06*

-.12**

-.81**

-.09**

-.29**

-.09**

-.08**

-.24**

-.05

-.04

-.04

-.12

-.04

-.04

-.11**

-.12**

-.03

-.10**

-.69**

-.07**

-.24**

-.07**

-.07**

-.21**

-.24**

-.11**

-.31**

-.04

-.03

-.03

.24**

-.02

-.03

-.07**

-.06**

-.04

-.04

-.03

-.01

-.03

-.02

-.02

.04

.08**

.02

-.02

.09**

.02

.05*

10

Industry 37

.05

.22

.07

11

Industry 38

.17

.38

12

R&D

.66

3.48

14

Patent Count
Munificence

316.94
.05

1650.37
.03

.08

**

.05

*
**

*

**

-.09**

Industry 35

**

**

**

8

13

**

-.07

-.11

*

.06

*

-.09

.39

.53

16

Firm Size

7.50

26.71

.12**

.11**

-.01

17

Firm Age

27.92

30.49

.27**

.14**

.03

19

Alliances
Complement. Assets

1.63
3.86

5.84
2.80

.05
.20

**

-.04
**

.07

**
**

**

-.68

Prior ROA

*

.06

**

**

15

18

10

.59

-.02

**

-.21

**

.18

**

**

.02

-.14

.01

.04

.07

.04

-.02

-.01

-.02

-.03

-.02

.17**

.10**

-.05*

.06*

.08**

-.02

-.07**

.08**

-.03
.11

.01

.07

**

.05

-.03

.00

-.04
.07

**

.05
**

-.07

**

*

-.03
**

.12**

**

-.08

-.06

.05

-.34

-.40

-.23**

-.19**

.08**

-.10**

.73**

.07**

-.08**

119.97

20.09

-.21

.19

21

Volatility

.01

.01

.08**

-.10**

.01

.38**

-.04

.24**

.04

22

Tech. Change

.43

2.16

-.01

.03

-.10**

-.07**

-.37**

-.02

-.04

**

-.21

-.29

-.01

-.30

.58**

-.03

-.04

-.03

.04

-.04

23

Complexity

20.58

9.66

-.18

-.22

-.04

.02

.37

24

External Comm.

.45

1.54

-.01

-.05*

-.04

-.03

.13**
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.06

*

*

Regime

**

.53

.07
**

**

20

**

**

-.18

**

.11

**

**

**

**

**

Table 4.1 Continued
Variables

11

1

Return on Assets

2

Industry 20

3

Industry 23

4

Industry 26

5

Industry 28

6

Industry 30

7

Industry 34

8

Industry 35

9

Industry 36

10

Industry 37

11

Industry 38

12

R&D

-.03

13

Patent Count

-.04

14

Munificence

.35

**

12

13

14

16

17

18

19

-.04

-.05

-.23

.06*

.04

16

Firm Size

-.09**

-.05*

.50**

17

Firm Age

**

**

-.10

18

Alliances

19
20

-.01

.09**

-.11

.20

**

.01

.20**

.35**

-.06*

-.01

.66**

.00

.04

.36**

.10**

Complement. Assets

-.11**

-.06*

.27**

-.02

.14**

.33**

.38**

.19**

Regime

.24**

.20**

-.08**

-.04

-.21**

-.06*

-.12**

.00

**

21

Volatility

-.13

.00

-.01

.09

22

Tech. Change

-.24**

-.11**

.09**

23

Complexity

-.02

.17**

.01

External Comm.

-.05

21

22

23

.00

Prior ROA

**

20

-.03

15

24

15

.04

.48

**

**

.08**

-.06*

-.08**

.12**

-.08**

-.33**

-.12**

-.17**

.07**

-.05

.28**

-.14**

.03

-.04

.01

.02

.09

-.10**

.08**

.00

-.05*

-.14**

.05*

-.01

-.02

.22
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**

-.06*

-.05

.04

.05

**

*

*

.64

**

.13

**

*

-.06

.09**

entered first, followed by the independent variables. A small but significant change in Adjusted
R2 was observed when the independent variables were added to the model (∆R2 = .01; p <.001).
Hypothesis 1a suggested a positive relationship between complementary assets and firm
performance as a baseline for the mediation effect. This relationship was supported (β= .07; p <
.01) as expected (Ceccagnoli, 2009). Hypothesis 2a suggested a positive relationship between the
appropriability regime and firm performance. However, in contrast to prior literature this
relationship (β= .06; ns) was not significant (Ceccagnoli, 2009). Finally the relationship
between environmental factors and firm performance were tested (Dess & Beard, 1984).
Environmental dynamism was tested using measures for volatility and technological change.
Volatility was significant (β= .06; p < .05), however technological change was not (β= -.06;
ns). Likewise, environmental complexity was not significant (β= .07; ns).
Model 3. The third condition for mediation is a direct effect of the mediator, external
commercialization, on the dependent variable, firm performance (Baron & Kenny, 1986).
Results are shown in model 3, Table 4.3. This relationship was not significant (β= -.02; ns)
providing no support for this component of the relationship. Unfortunately, this precludes
support for the mediation model as proposed, regardless of partial support that may have been
provided by the other tests.
Model 4. Finally, the full model tests for the mediation effect of external
commercialization (Model 4 Table 4.3). There was no observed change in the R2 or the estimates
for the independent variables when compared to Model 2. Thus, Model 4 is not significant,
reinforcing the lack of support evidenced in the previous models.
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Table 4.2 Negative Binomial Regression Results
Effects of Appropriability Conditions on
External Commercialization (n=1618)
Model 1
Model 2
Variable
Controlsa
Full Modela
Controls
Industry controls were included (ns)
Technological knowledge
R&D intensity
Patent count
Munificence
Firm prior performance
Firm size
Firm age
Alliances

-0.95
1.38
-0.47
1.77†
-0.91
0.45
5.80***

Independent Variables
Complementary assets
Appropriability regime
Environmental dynamism
Volatility
Rate of technological change
Environmental complexity
-2 Log Likelihood
Likelihood ratio χ2
Δ Likelihood ratio χ2
McFadden’s Adjusted R2
BIC
Δ BIC
a
Standardized z scores
† p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

-1041.74
475.63***
.165
-9672.33
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Model 3
Incident
Rate Ratio

-0.91
1.04
-0.53
1.64†
-1.10
0.23
4.24***

0.98
1.00
0.29
1.34†
1.00
1.00
1.05***

-0.18
-0.90

0.99
0.99

0.02
1.39
0.04

1.35
1.09
1.00

-1038.49
482.14***
6.49
.159
-9604.94
67.39

Table 4.3 OLS Regression Results
The Influence of Appropriability Conditions and External Commercialization
on Firm Performance
Dependent Variable ROA Lagged 4 years (n=1618)
Model 3
Mediator
Effects

Model 4a

Controls

Model 2
Direct
Effects

-.18***
.00
.01
.44***
.00
.15***
.03

-.18***
- .02
.00
.43***
-.01
.11***
.05

-.18***
.00
.01
.44***
.00
.15***
.03

-.18***
-.01
.00
.43***
-.01
.11***
.06

Variable

Controls
Industry controls were included
Technological knowledge
R&D intensity
Patent count
Munificence
Firm prior performance
Firm size
Firm age
Alliances
Independent Variables
Complementary assets
Appropriability regime
Environmental dynamism
Volatility
Rate of technological change
Environmental complexity

.07**
-.06

.07**
-.06

.06*
-.06
-.07

.06*
-.06
-.07

Mediating Variable
External Commercialization (EC)
Adjsuted-R2
∆ Adjusted R2
F-Stat
ΔF-Stat

.34
50.49***

a. Model 4 is in comparison to model 2
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Full Model

.35
.01***
41.24***
6.71***

-.02

-.02

.34
0.00
47.70***
.62

.35
0 .00
39.46***
.57

Post-hoc Tests
In view of the lack of support for the expected relationships, several post-hoc tests were
conducted. First, I ran the regression model using the Preacher and Hayes (2004) recommended
bootstrapping approach to mediation. Results were similar to the Baron and Kenney approach.
Tests for indirect effects were not significant. The test (homogeneity of interaction) for a
mediation effect across different levels of the independent variables were also not significant.
Constrained samples. In one set of tests I used constrained samples to test the
robustness of the results. The first subsample was a matched sample of 636 firms with equal
representation of those that had engaged in external commercialization and those that had not
(318 firms in each group). The purpose was to test whether the excessive number of firms with
zero external commercialization agreements was driving the results. The same method as above
was applied to this sample with the exception that the negative binomial regression did not
include the extension for zero inflation. Echoing the initial results, the fit indices favored the
control model over the full model (∆-2LL=6.42; ∆χ2=12.84; ∆McFadden’s R2=0.0; and
∆BIC=19.44) and there were no significant effects for the influence of appropriability conditions
on external commercialization. The remaining tests were conducted as before. There was
evidence of a negative relationship between the rate of technological change and firm
performance (β= -.14;p <.05). However there was no support for external commercialization as
a mediator in the full model (∆R2=0; ns).
Another subsample of 1362 firms that excluded 256 firms in the pharmaceutical industry
(SIC 283) was also tested. The pharmaceutical industry is unique in the high patent rate and
presence of contract research organizations that perform the research and development function
and then commercialize externally through large pharmaceutical companies. Results of the ZINB
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regression show the control model is a better fit to the data than the full model (∆-2LL=7.24; ∆
χ2=14.85; ∆McFadden’s R2=0.1; and ∆BIC=57.4). The direct relationships between the
appropriability conditions and firm performance were similar to the full sample in that
complementary assets (β= .08; p < .01) and volatility (β= .09; p < .01) exhibited positive
relationships with firm performance. However, unlike the initial model technological change (β
= .48 p < .05) and complexity (β= -.90; p < .01) were also significant. The appropriability
regime effects remained insignificant as did the mediating effect of external commercialization
(∆R2=0; ns).
Finally, a subsample containing only 318 firms that had engaged in external
commercialization was tested to discover the effect of the frequency of external
commercialization activity among those firms that had used this strategy. The main effect of the
appropriability conditions on external commercialization was tested using a standard Negative
Binomial regression. The fit indices (∆-2LL=3.56; ∆χ2=7.13; ∆McFadden’s R2=0.0; and
∆BIC=21.68) expressed persistent preferences for the control model over the full model.
Examination of the full model did show a significant relationship for the effect of
complementary assets on external commercialization (β = 2.20, irr = 1.04; p < .05). The
remaining mediation relationships were tested using OLS as above. The full model had an
Adjusted R2 of .45 (∆R2=0; ns). There were no significant effects of the appropriability
conditions or external commercialization (β =.01; ns) on firm performance.
External commercialization as a binary variable. An additional post-hoc test was
conducted to check whether the measurement of external commercialization influenced the
results. This time the variable was operationalized as a dichotomous variable with 1 representing
firms that had engaged in external commercialization and 0 for those that had not. Results of the
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binomial logit regression were significant for the effect of complementary assets (odds ratio .92;
p<.05) and environmental complexity (odds ratio 1.04; p<.01) on external commercialization.
However fit indices continued to show the control model a better fit to the data. Consistent with
the results of the hypothesized model, tests for mediation show that complementary assets (β=
.06; p < .01) and volatility (β= .06; p < .05) have a direct effect on firm performance. However,
there was no support for a mediation effect.
Tests of influence. A robustness test was conducted to check whether the (32) outliers
previously omitted from the analysis would influence the results. The models were analyzed
with 1650 observations. However the zero inflated negative binomial model failed to converge
using the full data set. Visual examination of the leverage versus residual squared plot showed
seven observations that appeared to be truly problematic and these were deleted. The models
were run again using the remaining 1643 observations. The indicators of model fit were similar
to the original results, as were the significance and magnitude of the regression coefficients.
Thus, although the original omission of outliers may have been aggressive in eliminating points
of influence, this did not affect the results
Exclusion of industry controls and alternatively specified inflator. I also had
concerns that the industry controls may have attenuated the overall results for the model because
industry factors were accounted for in the independent variables. Specifically appropriability
regime, environmental dynamism and environmental complexity were measured at the industry
level. Thus, an alternative model excluding industry controls was tested in a post-hoc analysis.
In this model I also altered the model for the zero inflated negative binomial regression.
In this model an additional variable was introduced specifically to predict the excess zero’s in the
data. According to Long and Freese (2006) the variable specified for the inflate portion of the
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equation should be specifically targeted at predicting excess zeros and may not necessarily be
one of the variables in the model being tested. Thus, I specified External Commercialization
Intensity in the inflate component of the ZINB equation. External Commercialization Intensity
is a measure of the percentage of firm revenue received from licensing, aggregated at the
industry level. The data are sourced from the 2002 Census. Because a census measure offers a
better representation of the true magnitude of activity compared to other data sources, it is ideal
for predicting excess zeros due to underreporting compared to real zeros due to a firm’s
inactivity in external commercialization. The ZINB estimation equation for the full model in
STATA is:
DV = Controls (excluding industry dummies) IVs, inflate (EC intensity)

Consistent with prior results, the post-hoc tests for the direct effects of the independent
variables on the mediator shown in Table 4.4 indicates the control model is a better fit for the
data than the full model (∆-2LL= 11.01; ∆χ2= 22.02; ∆McFadden’s R2=-.01; and ∆BIC=14.93).
However, in an improvement from the original model, the variables for complementary assets
(β= -1.73; p < .10), appropriability regime (β= 2.62; p < .01), and environmental complexity (β=
1.67; p < .10) were significant. Likewise, the results of the OLS regression shown in Table 4.5
failed to support a mediation effect. However improvements in the significance of the
independent variables were observed for complementary assets (β= .06; p < .01), appropriability
regime (β= -.08; p < .001) and rate of technological change (β= -.08; p < .001).
Alternative Model Specification: Moderation
Although the tests of the proposed model produced no support for the original
hypotheses, further investigation revealed interactions between appropriability conditions and
firm performance. Moderating relationships were tested using OLS regression in Models 1-3
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Table 4.4 Post-hoc Industry Controls Excluded
Negative Binomial Regression Results - EC Intensity Predictor
Effects of Appropriability Conditions on
External Commercialization (n=1618)
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Controlsa

Full Modela

Model 3
Incident
Rate Ratio

1.71†
-.05
.02
-2.72 **
.81
-1.74†
5.27***

1.47
.51
.09
-1.73†
.92
-1.02
4.91***

1.02
1.0
1.19
.80
1.0
1.0
1.13

-1.73†
2.62 **

.95
1.01

1.1
-.93
1.67†

.97
1.01

Controls
Technological knowledge
R&D intensity
Patent count
Munificence
Firm prior performance
Firm size
Firm age
Alliances
Independent Variables
Complementary Assets
Appropriability regime
Environmental dynamism
Volatility
Rate of technological change
Environmental complexity
-2 Log Likelihood
2
Likelihood ratio χ
2
∆ Likelihood ratio χ
McFadden’s Adjusted R2
BIC
∆ BIC
a

-1128.88
301.36***
.105
-9579.33

Standardized z scores

† p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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-1139.89
279.34***
22.02
.101
-9594.26
14.93

Table 4.5 Post-hoc Industry Controls Excluded
OLS Regression Results
The Influence of Appropriability Conditions and External Commercialization
on Firm Performance
Dependent Variable ROA Lagged 4 years (n=1618)
Variable

Controls

Model 2
Direct
Effects

Model 3
Mediator
Effects

Model 4a

-.18***
-.02
.01
.43***
0.0
.12***
.04

-.19***
0.0
.03
.45***
.01
.16***
.025

-.18***
-.01
.01
.43***
0.0
.12***
.05

Full Model

Controls
Technological knowledge
R&D intensity
Patent count
Munificence
Firm prior performance
Firm size
Firm age
Alliances

-.19***
0.0
.03
.45***
.01
.16***
.03

Independent Variables
Complementary Assets
Appropriability regime
Environmental dynamism
Volatility
Rate of technological change
Environmental complexity

.06**
-.08***

.06**
-0.0***

.03
-.08***
-.04†

.03
-.08***
-.04†

Mediating Variable
External Commercialization (EC)
Adjsuted-R2
∆ Adjusted R2
F-Stat
∆F-Stat

.34
118.71***

a. Model 4 is in comparison to model 2
† p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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.36
.02***
74.27***
8.3***

.03

.03

.34
.001†
103.22***
2.91†

.36
0.0
68.26***
.87

shown in Table 4.6. The controls are entered in Model 1, followed by the direct effects in Model
2 and the interaction effects in model 3. There is a significant change in R2 from Model 2
(R2=.35) to Model 3 (R2=.36). Model 3 also shows significant interaction effects for the rate of
technological change (β= .07; p < .01), environmental complexity (β= -.08; p < .05) and the
appropriability regime (β= .10; p < .01). However there was not a significant interaction effect
for complementary assets (β= -.03; ns) or volatility (β= -.03; ns).
To better interpret the moderation effects, the significant interactions were plotted in
Figures 4.1- 4.3 (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Figure 4.1 illustrates that at high levels of external
commercialization high rates of technological change are associated with moderate increases in
ROA. Conversely, at low levels of external commercialization higher rates of technological
change decreases ROA. Thus, external commercialization reduces the otherwise negative effect
of the rate of technological change on ROA. The moderation effect of external
commercialization on environmental complexity is shown in Figure 4.2. Here we observe that
high external commercialization strengthens the negative relationship between environmental
complexity and ROA. However, when external commercialization is low environmental
complexity has limited effect on ROA. Finally, Figure 4.3 shows that at high levels of external
commercialization, high appropriability regimes are associated with increases in ROA.
Conversely, at low levels of external commercialization high appropriability regimes are
associated with decreasing ROA. Further discussion of these interactions is reserved for the next
chapter This chapter reported the results of the hypothesis tests and several post-hoc tests.
Alternative model specifications were also tested. These results are discussed in the next chapter.
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Table 4.6 Alternative Model Specification
Moderating Effects of External Commercialization
on Firm Performance
Dependent Variable ROA Lagged 4 years (n=1618)
Variable
Controls
Industry controls were included
Technological knowledge
R&D intensity
Patent count
Munificence
Firm prior performance
Firm size
Firm age
Alliances

Model 1
Controls

Model 2
Direct Effects

-.18***
.00
.01
.44***
.00
.15***
.03

-.18***
- .02
.00
.43***
-.01
.11***
.05

Independent Variables
Complementary assets
Environmental dynamism
Volatility
Rate of technological change
Environmental complexity
Appropriability regime

.06*
-.06
-.07
-.06

Moderating Variable
External Commercialization (EC)

-.02

.07**

Interactions
EC x Complementary assets
EC x Appropriability regime
EC x Volatility
EC x Rate of technological change
EC x Environmental complexity
Adjsuted-R2
∆ Adjusted R2
F-Stat
ΔF-Stat
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Model 3
Interactions

-.03
.10**
-.03
.07**
-.08*
.34
50.49***
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.35
.01***
39.46***
7.29***

.36
.01***
32.97***
2.34*
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CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This Chapter provides a discussion of the study findings in four sections. In the first
section I provide an overview of the study and discuss the overall findings. Specific results for
each hypothesis and insights from additional findings are also discussed. Next, I take stock of the
theoretical, empirical and practical contributions of the study. Finally, I address limitations and
suggest directions for future research.
Overview
Innovation has been identified as a source of competitive advantage (Hamel, 2000).
Indeed investment in innovation has grown on a worldwide basis (NSF, 2010). Yet, firms are
challenged to earn a return on this investment in innovation (Teece, 1986; Thomas & D'Aveni,
2009). External commercialization may be one strategy firms can employ to increase the value
appropriated from their investment innovation. Prior literature has provided logic for external
commercialization and evidence of the factors that lead a firm to engage in external
commercialization (Arora & Gambardella, 2010a; Chesbrough, 2003). However the literature is
lacking in a strategic theoretical grounding as well as evidence linking external
commercialization to firm performance.
Understanding whether, and under what conditions, external commercialization has
performance advantages is a needed extension of the current literature (Walter, 2012). It is also
vital to understand the performance consequences of an external commercialization strategy in
providing guidance to managers seeking returns on their investment in innovation. Further, a
strategic theoretical approach is needed to position external commercialization firmly within the
strategy literature. Two research questions emerged from this need.
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1. What conditions influence the extent to which a firm engages in external
commercialization?
2. Does external commercialization influence firm performance?

I applied the theoretical lens of real options theory to investigate the drivers and
performance consequences of external commercialization. The firm’s initial investment in
technological knowledge has been positioned in the literature as an irreversible investment that
provides the firm with an option to commercialize the innovation in the future (McGrath, 1997,
Miller, 2002). The option is valuable because it provides managerial flexibility to hold, abandon
or exercise an option in uncertain environments (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1999; Dixit & Pindyck,
1994).
To further develop the theoretical model, I integrated the constructs of the appropriability
framework (Teece, 1986) with real options theory. More specifically, the model proposes that the
appropriability conditions of complementary assets (irreversible investment), appropriability
regime and market timing (uncertainty) will influence the external commercialization decision
(managerial flexibility). Accordingly, managers are expected to select a commercialization
strategy that enhances the level of appropriation and firm performance. Thus, external
commercialization mediates the relationship between appropriability conditions and firm
performance. Hypotheses were derived from this model and tested in a large scale empirical
design.
Discussion of Research Findings
As a whole, the results reported in Chapter 4 do not provide support for the hypotheses.
The first part of this discussion takes holistic perspective, examining the lack of findings overall.
This is followed by a more detailed discussion of each hypothesis. Finally, the findings from the
alternative model specification are explored.
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Taken together, the results do not provide evidence of a real options approach to external
commercialization of innovation. External commercialization is, in the main, a strategy of
incremental returns (Grindley & Teece, 1997; Walter, 2012). It was proposed here as untapped
potential for firms that were not well positioned to appropriate value from direct
commercialization of their innovation. The returns were not expected to exceed those of direct
commercialization under strong appropriability conditions (Teece, 1986; Rivette & Kline, 2000).
Thus, providing evidence of significant relationships for what was posited as incremental returns
was an inherent challenge in this research.
At the same time I recognized that external commercialization is an underutilized
strategy. Indeed, the motivation for the study was driven in part by the potential for managers to
consider this strategy more often as a way to increase returns on the investment in innovation.
The analytical method and the post-hoc tests provided some assurance that the large number of
firms that had no external commercialization activity was not driving the results. However, I
cannot rule out the influence that the low frequency of external commercialization among firms
did use this strategy may have had on the results. The low utilization combined with marginal
returns may have made it particularly difficult to detect a relationship with the return on assets
performance measure (Combs, et al., 2005). A performance measure that is more proximate to
external commercialization may be better suited to uncover the expected returns from this
strategy (Walter, 2012).
Finally, it is possible that the returns from external commercialization are in fact not
appropriated by the focal firm to the extent proposed (Crook, Ketchen, Combs & Todd, 2008;
Teece, 1986; Winter, 2006). Indeed, the challenge of appropriating value from innovation was a
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major motivation for this study. Having provided explanations for the overall results, I now turn
to a discussion of each hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1a and b: complementary assets. In Hypothesis 1, I reasoned that firms
faced with weak complementary asset positions were likely to use an external commercialization
strategy to enhance performance. Consistent with prior literature, the positive relationship
between complementary assets and firm performance (H1a) was significant (Tripsas, 1997).
However the results did not support the mediation effect of external commercialization.
Complementary assets did not have an influence on external commercialization, nor did external
commercialization influence firm performance (H1b).
These results confirm the underlying premise that strong complementary asset positions
have a positive influence on the firm’s ability to appropriate value from its own innovation
(Teece, 1986). Yet the results suggest that external commercialization does not play a role in this
relationship. One explanation may be that firm’s use other types of agreements to compensate for
their lack of complementary assets (Ahuja, 2000; Stuart, 2000). For example, manufacturing or
marketing agreements provide the firm with access to appropriation enhancing complementary
assets but fall outside the definition of external commercialization (Adner & Kapoor, 2010).
Although alliance agreements of all types were controlled for, it may be more appropriate to
include them in the operational definition and measurement of complementary assets (Walter,
2012). This could provide a sharper distinction between the levels of complementary assets
available to the firm.
Hypothesis 2a and b: appropriability regime. Consistent with real options reasoning, I
hypothesized that firms operating in weak appropriability regimes could use an external
commercialization strategy to appropriate some value from innovation (Vanhaverbeke et al.,
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2008). The absence of a direct relationship between appropriability regime and firm
performance was surprising (H2a), given that this has been established in prior literature
(Ceccagnoli, 2009). Neither did the evidence support a mediated relationship (H2b). The
appropriability regime did not have a significant influence on external commercialization and
external commercialization did not affect firm performance.
One explanation for the overall lack of significance associated with the appropriability
regime may lie in level of analysis used to measure this variable. The literature provides ample
foundation to use an industry-level measure (Cohen et al., 2000) on the basis that appropriability
regimes tend to be homogeneous within, and heterogeneous across, industries (Pisano & Teece,
2007). Yet an industry level measure may not be fine-grained enough to detect differences in the
individual firm’s ability to protect their intellectual property. A measure that includes firm-level
indicators of protection such as patent lawsuits or patenting intensity relative to the industry may
be more productive in testing this relationship. In addition, and contrary to the hypothesized
relationship, some studies have found that firms in tighter appropriability regimes are more likely
to license technology precisely because they can protect it (Ceccagnoli, 2009; Fosfuri, 2006). It
is possible that the results are confounded by these offsetting effects.
Hypothesis 3: environmental dynamism. I hypothesized that external
commercialization would increase with the level of environmental dynamism (Chen et al., 2010;
Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007). Two dimensions of environmental dynamism were considered in
the model - volatility and the rate of technological change in the industry. The results for
Hypothesis 3 did not support a relationship with external commercialization for either
dimension.
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Hypothesis 4: environmental complexity. I hypothesized that more complex
environments would lead to more external commercialization (Ahuja, 2000; Eisenhardt &
Schoonhoven, 1996). However, the relationship was not supported. One explanation for this
may be that differences in the level of environmental complexity do not result so much in more
or less frequency of external commercialization, but different patterns of agreements (Rosenkopf
& Schilling, 2007). Likewise, different patterns of agreements, for example between industry
leaders and smaller firms versus equally balanced competitors, are expected to have varying
returns to the focal firm due to bargaining power (Porter, 1980).
In addition, the literature upon which Hypothesis 4 was developed applied to the
frequency of all types of inter-firm agreements (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2002, Stuart, 2000).
Although extrapolation of the literature to external commercialization agreements is a logical
step, certainly these are a small portion of the total number of inter-firm agreements captured by
these studies. Idiosyncrasies or boundary conditions may apply to external commercialization
agreements that do not apply in the more general case of inter-firm agreements (Walter, 2012),
contributing to the lack of findings for Hypothesis 4.
Insights from Additional Findings
Given the absence of the expected relationships between the constructs of interest I
formulated a post-hoc investigation of an alternatively specified model. This model posited a
moderated, rather than a mediated, relationship between external commercialization and the
variables previously tested. The results produced significant interactions for appropriability
regime, rate of technological change (dynamism) and environmental complexity, with external
commercialization. This suggests that the alternatively specified model of moderation may be a
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more appropriate representation of the relationships than the originally proposed mediation
model.
In the alternative model, external commercialization moderated the influence of the
appropriability regime on firm performance. Specifically, higher levels of external
commercialization in tight appropriability regimes were associated with increases in performance
(Figure 4.3). Although this interaction effect was not hypothesized, it is consistent with prior
literature that shows a positive relationship between the strength of the appropriability regime
and the propensity to license (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; Cohen et al., 2000).
The alternative specification for moderation also produced a significant interaction of
technological change with external commercialization. Specifically low levels of external
commercialization in environments with high rates of technological change were associated with
a decreasing return on assets, while higher levels of external commercialization had little effect
on performance across high and low rates of technological change (Figure 4.1). This is consistent
with the original logic presented in the hypotheses, that environments of rapid technological
change provide opportunities for firms to introduce new technologies and garner momentum for
adoption of these technologies (Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Utterback & Abernathy, 1975).
However the asymmetric pattern of returns in the interaction suggest that the opportunity cost of
not putting the technology into the fray may be greater than the incremental return appropriated
from external commercialization (Grindley & Teece, 1997 Pisano & Teece, 2007; Winter, 2006).
Indeed firms that do not leverage market timing are likely to find their technologies left behind
(McGrath, 1997).
The interaction of environmental complexity with external commercialization was also
significant in the alternative model. The results show that high external commercialization in
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high complexity environments is associated with decreasing ROA, while low levels of external
commercialization have little effect on ROA (Figure 4.2). One explanation for this finding is that
the risk of imitation is greater in complex environments with relatively more balanced
competitors vying for technological dominance (McGrath, 1997). Thus external
commercialization appears to be risky when the potential benefits of technology diffusion are
offset by the loss of appropriation to other industry participants (Alexy & Reitzig, 2012; Coff &
Laverty, 2001: Lavie, 2006).
The results of the post-hoc specification with the industry controls excluded are also
worth noting. Industry controls were included in the primary study because of the possibility
that unobserved heterogeneity at the industry level could influence the results. However,
because the industry level variables relevant to the study are included as predictors in the model I
also had to consider the likelihood that the controls were attenuating the effects of the predictors.
The removal of the industry controls did not change the results for the overall models or the
mediation effect. The Adjusted R2 (.36) was the same in both models. However, there was a
change in the level of significance for the industry-level predictors. Appropriability regime
changed from β= -.06; ns to β= -.08; p < .001. Rate of technological change also shifted from β=
-.06; ns to β= -.08; p < .001 and environmental complexity was marginally significant (β= -.04).
These results suggest that the more parsimonious model without industry controls effectively
explains the outcomes with minimal risk of under-specification.
Contributions
Notwithstanding the lack of empirical results in this dissertation, some contributions have
been made. These contributions lie in the theoretical extensions and intersections of the current
literature. Real options theory has been previously applied to innovation strategy

86

(McGrath, 1997), and as a financial model for funding research and development (Amram &
Kulatilaka, 1999). However, real options theory has not been previously applied to open
innovation or the external commercialization decision. Scholars of open innovation such as
Chesbrough (2003) have suggested that real options may have potential to provide the theoretical
grounding needed in the open innovation and external commercialization literature. Reflecting
on the theoretical grounding for external commercialization, Arora & Gambardella (2010a)
observed that the antecedents of licensing activity are often based on the appropriability
framework, but lack a richer theoretical foundation. They highlighted the need for a more
strategic theoretical explanation for licensing activity, beyond the current economic view of the
boundaries of the firm. This dissertation provides this strategic lens through the application of
real options theory. In sum, the application of real options theory at the intersection of the
appropriability framework and external commercialization provides a unique contribution to the
literature.
From an empirical perspective I set out to make a contribution by testing a set of
hypotheses which span the motivations and performance consequences of external
commercialization. The lack of empirical support found in this study means that this contribution
cannot be made as originally proposed. However progress has been made. The lack of support
for the hypothesized relationships may imply that boundary conditions act in a contingent
manner as suggested by the post-hoc results for the moderation model. Indeed, these boundary
conditions may also be more finite than could be detected in this high level study. This is
productive in pointing to future research that examines external commercialization at a more
detailed level.
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Similarly, provision of practical guidance to managers is also precluded by the lack of
empirical support found in this study. Yet, this is also instructive. It is likely that external
commercialization is advisable only under specific conditions. As suggested in the preceding
paragraph, a finely grained study aimed at detecting tighter boundary conditions may provide
more specific insights needed to provide recommendations for managers. This future research is
discussed in the following section.
Limitations
Notwithstanding the methodological rigor applied in this study, some limitations remain.
Alliance data, including agreements that fit the definition of external commercialization, are
subject to under-reporting (Schilling, 2009). Although the data includes a broad scope of primary
sources, there are no regulatory requirements for reporting these contractual relationships.
Therefore the data probably represents a sample rather than a population of agreements.
However, Schilling (2009) reported consistent results across different datasets which provided
some confidence that the data is representative.
In addition, return on assets is just one measure of firm performance that may not fully
reflect the value appropriated from a firm’s innovation activity (Crook et al., 2008). One study
has measured the returns from external commercialization using abnormal stock returns (Walter,
2012) and performance measurement using alternative measures such as Tobin’s Q, market share
or return on sales may also be fruitful (Combs et al., 2005). A finer-grained analysis of the
innovation value appropriated by the firm and by other participants conducted at the productmarket level may be necessary to understand the full gamut of appropriation from innovation
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Lavie, 2006).
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Finally, in applying real options theory and the appropriability framework to external
commercialization I did not address individual-level behavioral factors that may influence the
technology commercialization decision. Indeed some of the debate surrounding real options
theory highlights these very issues (Adner & Levinthal, 2004a; Barnett, 2008; McGrath et al.,
2004). Option traps are one manifestation of how managerial behavior influences the
commercialization decision (Adner & Levinthal, 2004a). Option traps contribute to managerial
reluctance to abandon investments as well as reluctance to exercise options. Option traps are
driven in part by the psychological tendency to escalate commitment (Brockner, 1992; Staw,
1981). The escalation of commitment is one example of a behavioral factor that was not included
in this study and may have contributed to the lack of findings.
Future Research
Some of the findings from this study, albeit limited, do provide direction for future
research. First, the specification for a moderated relationship did indicate an interaction between
external commercialization and the effect of appropriability conditions on firm performance.
This specification should be pursued and could be augmented by a sharpening of measures as
discussed previously in this Chapter.
The findings also point to a strong relationship between external commercialization and
other types of alliances. External commercialization is only one type of inter-firm agreement.
The decision to commercialize a technology externally is not likely to be made in isolation, but
rather in the context of a broader innovation strategy as well as other types of inter-firm
agreements (Ahuja, 2000; George, Zahra, Wheatley & Khan, 2001). I envision two paths for
potential investigation, both of which would leverage a real options approach.
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First, external commercialization could be viewed as an initial investment in a
relationship that provides the focal firm with an option to increase the level of commitment to the
relationship in the future. Licensing may be a means to enter a simple arms length contractual
relationship that enables the focal firm to gain experience with the partner and reduce the
uncertainty associated with entering a more extensive relationship such as research and
development alliances or joint ventures. If a time series analysis revealed that external
commercialization occurs early in a sequence of relationships between the same firms, this may
provide evidence that firms use licensing as a nested option to establish relationships with other
firms.
A second study could examine external commercialization in the context of a larger
innovation strategy. Indeed firms that employ open innovation strategies may develop
innovations internally or source them externally, as well as commercialize these innovations
internally or externally. Previous research has examined the complementarity of external
knowledge sourcing and internal research and development in the context of absorptive capacity
(Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2009).4 Similarly, investigation of the complementarity between
external commercialization and the other innovation strategies is also worthwhile.
Opportunities to extend this study to include individual-level cognitive factors should
also be pursued. For example, resistance to open innovation in general and external
commercialization in particular, sometimes referred to as the not invented here and not sold here
syndromes may be due to mangers cognitive inertia connected to a tradition of vertically
integrated innovation strategies (Chesbrough, 2003). This may be an additional reason for

4

Absorptive capacity and learning also provide an interesting context for investigation of external
commercialization. That is, can firms actually learn to do this well? Lichtenthaler (2009) described this notion as
desorptive capacity – a firms’ capability to transfer knowledge out, rather than transfer knowledge in.
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underutilization of a potentially beneficial strategy. Understanding causes and interventions
related to cognitive inertia may facilitate effective implementation of open innovation strategies
(Reger, Gustafson, Demarie & Mullane, 1994).
Alternatively, external commercialization may be inhibited because managers simply do
not recognize potential outlets for their technologies (Rivette & Kline, 2000). Managerial focus
on developing and commercializing technologies internally may preclude recognition of external
opportunities (Busenitz & Barney, 1997). If these opportunities are distant from the core
technology or industry, managers may not perceive the opportunity as relevant to them (Haynie,
Shepherd & McMullen 2009). Thus, future research could incorporate a cognitive approach by
considering the moderating effect of opportunity recognition on external commercialization
(Bingham, Eisenhardt & Furr, 2007).
Finally, the institutional environment was not addressed in this study. The investment in
technological knowledge is conducted in complex and ambiguous task environments and
decisions are made by managers who are subject to bounded rationality (Cyert & March, 1963;
Duncan, 1972). Faced with the decision to commercialize technology managers decisions are
likely to be influenced by institutional pressures and interpretive schemes that call for different
types of investment decisions (Reus et al., 2009). Likewise, Barnett (2008) has proposed that
formal and informal institutional structures are likely to shape managerial attentiveness and
options decisions. Accordingly, future research integrating an institutional and cognitive lens
may be productive in providing an explanation of commercialization of technological
knowledge.
With regard to the methodological approach, I investigated external commercialization
by analyzing quantitative archival data to test hypotheses. This approach is typical of maturing
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streams of research, and is also likely to provide incremental contributions to the literature
(Edmondson & McManus, 2007). Moving the literature forward at this juncture may require a
rigorous qualitative approach that taps a deeper understanding of contemporary innovation
processes. A multi-method qualitative study of a small sample of “serial licensors” could make
such a contribution. A qualitative design could include unobtrusive thematic content analysis
followed by semi-structured interviews with the managers responsible for innovation (Langley,
1999). This methodological approach has potential to uncover new propositions and constructs
to move the literature forward in a meaningful way (Eisenhardt, 1999).
Conclusion
Theoretical contributions from this research were made by extending real options theory
to the appropriability framework and external commercialization. However, this study was
unable to provide a conclusive response to the original research questions. There was an overall
lack of empirical support for the hypothesized relationships between appropriability conditions,
external commercialization and firm performance. One reason may be that the boundary
conditions are more specific than were examined in this study. The future research
recommended here has potential to further drill down on these questions and extend the literature
in new and exciting ways.
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